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THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AS APPLIED TO
CORPORATIONS
DAVID SIMONt
THE lawyer often finds himself at the entrance to a field that lacks markers,
paths, or even a solitary footprint to show there were travelers before him.
Perhaps the ground has never been crossed, or has long since been abandoned;
but more commonly, there have been frequent visitors who left no trace.
This last, one suspects, is the case with the subject matter of this analysis.
No doubt the attorney-client privilege problems affecting corporations are
mapped out in intra-office memos, in the practices of litigators, and in the
thinking habits of judges." However, there are only a handful of modem de-
cisions dealing directly with some of the difficulties that arise in applying the
traditional rules of the privilege to corporations.
It is generally assumed that corporations and other legal entities are entitled
to the privilege just as much as individuals are. The idea seems to go un-
challenged-perhaps because in law, as in life, many of the most deeply be-
lieved assumptions are unspoken. Indeed, one can imagine the response of the
surprised practitioner to any suggestion that it be otherwise: "Why should a
corporation not be entitled to the privilege? Cannot a corporation sue and be
sued? Is it not punishable for its crimes? Does it not need legal advice of
its own? How could it go about getting such advice if its confidences were
not respected? It is an ancient rule that a master is privileged to consult
with counsel through his servant, a principal through his agent-why not a
corporation in the same way ?"
These arguments certainly sound right as a matter of common law, and a
few cases have so intimated.2 Moreover, the American statutes codifying the
common law attorney-client privilege generally refer to the "client" rather
than to a "person, ' 3 and perhaps a corporation would fit within th6 former
tMember of the New York Bar.
1. Preservation of the privilege for corporate law departments was discussed in
concise but illuminating fashion by Lawrence S. Apsey, Esq., at the Practicing Law
Institute's llth Annual Summer Session, July, 1952, in New York City. See PLI,
COIU'oRATh HOUSE COUNSEL COURSE, LEcTURE OUTLINES AND MATERIALS (1952).
2. Stewart Equipment Co. v. Gallo, 32 N.J. Super. 15, 107 A.2d 527 (L. 1954);
Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio "St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906) ; Mayor & Corp. of Bristol v. Cox,
26 Ch. D. 678, 682 (1884); cf. United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S.
318, 336 (1915); Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 87 Fed. 563,
564 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1898); Robertson v. Virginia, 181 Va. 520, 539, 25 S.E.2d 352, 360
(1943). Usually the point is assumed without discussion. E.g., McWilliams v. American
Fidelity Co., 140 Conn. 572, 581, 102 A.2d 345, 349 (1954); cf. Consolidated Theatres,
Inc. v. Warner Bros. Cir. Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954).
3. See the listing of statutes in 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (3d ed. 1940) (herein-
after cited as WIGMORE). The English Companies Act of 1948 codifies the privilege-
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term more easily than the latter. Granting, then, as I believe we must, that
under present law a corporation is dearly entitled to the privilege, the initial
question is whether this result is justifiable.
First, let us examine the nature of the privilege, and the policies lying behind
it. Wigmore states the rule thus:
"Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal ad-
viser in his capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose,
made in confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently protected
from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, except the protection
be waived." 4
Justifying the rule is the thought that legitimate legal assistance would be less
effective if either client or attorney could be questioned about the client's
confidences against the client's will.5 It does seem likely that absent the rule
clients would be less frank or, perhaps, that their lawyers would be less
honest.6 Of course, every evidentiary privilege excludes relevant facts and
presumably for corporations-in common-law terms. 11, & 12 GEo. 6, c. 38, § 175. See
also the Exchange Control Act, 1947, 10 & 11 GEo. 6, c. 14, § 34, 5th Seh. § 1(3) ("any
person").
The American Law Institute's Model Code explicitly defines "client" as "a person
or corporation or other association that, directly or through an authorized representative,"
consults counsel. MODEL CODE OF EVIDmCE rule 209(a) (1942).
4. 8 Wina oax § 2292, at 558. (Enumeration omitted.)
5. See, generally, 8 WIGaIoRE §§ 2290, 2294(3) ; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 210,
comment a (1942).
6. Some commentators have criticized the modern privilege as an outmoded protection
largely benefitting perjurers and an unworthy obstacle to truth-seeking. See, e.g., Radin,
Lawyer and Client, 16 CAUF. L. Rxv. 487 (1928). Indeed, Professor 'Morgan has strongly
hinted that the ALI's Model Code preserves the privilege only as a political concession
to the organized Bar. Morgan, Foreword, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcCE 28 (1942). Along
with Radin, Morgan suggests that the privilege is justified only as an aspect of the policy
against self-incrimination and the rights of persons accused of crime. Radin, supra at
490, 493; Morgan, op. cit. supra at 27. Morgan seems to rest his reasoning on (1) a
doubt that the privilege actually stimulates confidences, and (2) a suggestion that at
least in civil matters there can be no legitimate motive for a client to wish information
to be kept secret.
Argument (1) is of course a question of fact. Yet it is a rare lawyer who has not
personally experienced the need for coaxing information from reticent or bashful clients.
Whether or not the privilege assists in this process it seems likely that the attorney would
pursue his inquiry with less vigor if he anticipated that he himself might be called as a
witness. Argument (2) is really the nub of the matter, for there can be no doubt
that the privilege sometimes serves to protect one who has done wrong. Yet, if the
privilege were abolished, would there be any lasting improvement? Would not the very
people who should be unmasked be able to find lawyers who could keep their confidences
to themselves?
It seems to this writer that the true subjects of the privilege are the clients who
are in the common position of not really "knowing" the facts because they do not under-
stand the significance of what they think they saw or -now remember. It is precisely
because facts are subtle, elusive, and often unknowable that counsel (in civil as well as
in criminal cases) is expected to show them in their best light, just as his adversary
has the task of putting them in their worst. The entire process of cross-examining ones
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is to that extent a mixed good. In this case, however, the original source of
the information-the client himself-may always be questioned as to matters
within his own knowledge, so that in many instances the privilege merely
means that an attorney may not be called to impeach his own client.7 On
balance, the price for improving the client-attorney relationship does not seem
too high.
As for corporations, they certainly benefit as much as any individual from
legitimate legal assistance. This particular privilege should not be denied them
merely because of their power, wealth or quasi-public position, since-unlike
the privilege against self-incrimination, which they do not enjoy 8-it is not
intended as a shield to the weak, but rather as an encouragement to all, strong
and weak alike, to consult freely with counsel.9 In the long run, if our laws
tend to be good, good legal advice should benefit society as well as General
Motors.
Granting the need, what of the price? Where corporations are involved,
with their large number of agents, masses of documents, and frequent dealings
with lawyers, the zone of silence grows large. Few judges-or legislators
own client in camcra, of finding and presenting facts whose exact contours may never be
known, is in our society a vital aspect of legitimate partisanship. Perhaps there are some
isolated areas of adjudication where clients should be required to throw themselves upon
the mercy and discretion of an impartial inquisitor. Yet it hardly seems feasible to
dispense with the adversary system everywhere and at one blow. The result would not
be less partisanship, but a different kind, for the unscrupulous lawyer and the dishonest
client would be able to thread a path that the more conscientious could never follow.
7. See 8 Wicmxoa § 2291, at 557. Of course, the privilege is not conditioned on the
availability of other evidence, and hardship cases are possible-as, for example, where the
client has died. See 8 id. § 2323 (privilege survives client's death). The cost of the
privilege in terms of missing evidence seems greatest when immunity is granted to
writings given to the attorney. See text at pp. 978-81 infra. Thus, in England the modern
privilege evolved from a struggle over the written "case made ,for counsel." 8 id. § 2294,
at 566. As the cost increases, the temptation is to seek an ad hoc solution by making the
immunity conditional on the subsequent need of the party demanding the inspection, and
one recent case has suggested the possibility of implanting such a limitation on the
common law privilege. See Frank C. Sparks Co. v. Huber Baking Co., 114 A.2d 657, 660
n.4 (Del. Super. Ct. 1955).
8. See 8 WIGA1OaR § 2259a. The privilege against self-incrimination seems to have
been denied to corporate and other business entities because the policy of personal fair-
ness is inapplicable and because the volume of their ordinary records makes any other
result impractical. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1944) (labor
union) ; United States v. Onassis, 133 F. Supp. 327, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (partnership).
9. Presumably similar reasoning explains the assumption that the government is as
much entitled to the attorney-client privilege as are private persons. E.g., Connecticut
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (attorneys for state
bridge commission); Cogdill v. TVA, 7 F.R.D. 411, 415 (E.D. Tenn. 1947) (TVA
general counsel) ; Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267 P.2d 1025 (1954) (counsel
for city transit authority) ; Rowley v. Ferguson, 48 N.E.2d 243, 248 (Ohio App. 1942)
(state attorney general). Cf. Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950) (interviews taken by FBI for government counsel may
qualify as "work product"); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461,
462-63 (D. Mich. 1954) (same).
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either, for that matter-would long tolerate any common law privilege that
allowed corporations to insulate all their activities by discussing them with
legal advisers. It is this risk, and this challenge, that underlie a number of
attorney-client privilege problems peculiar to corporations. Among the prob-
lems are these: Through whom may a corporation speak as client: directors?
officers? employees? stockholders? When is a corporation's attorney-includ-
ing "house counsel"-acting as an attorney, and when as an unprivileged
investigator, businessman or corporate functionary? To what extent should
the attorney's activities immunize ordinary corporate records? May com-
munications with counsel be stored in the corporation's open files? How
many corporate agents may be present at a meeting with counsel? What of
subsequent litigation between the corporation and its agents?
WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CLIENT?
The privilege protects only communications between the client and his
attorney. It does not protect the confidential disclosures of "third parties,"
even though the lawyer may be seeing those parties at the instance of his
client,10 for this relationship is not of the kind that the privilege seeks to foster.
The distinction between "client" and "third party," as applied to corpora-
tions, presents a basic dilemma. A corporation can speak only through its
representatives. Unless some of them can speak as client all disclosures on
behalf of the corporation will necessarily be reduced to the unprivileged status
of third party statements. Yet, if a corporation were permitted to designate
anyone at all as its spokesman, or to adopt as its own any disclosures made
for it, the corporate privilege would be extended far beyond that allowed to
the individual client. The problem cannot be solved by a simple reference to
the law of agency, for it is not enough that the spokesman is a corporate
agent; the question is whether the good that the privilege seeks to accomplish
-- candor between client and attorney-would be defeated unless the particular
agent were permitted to speak for the corporation.
Directors and Officers
If anyone can act for a corporation in seeking legal advice, surely it is a
director or an officer. Although authority is scant, it seems fairly safe to
assume that a vote by the board of directors, or by the shareholders, would
ordinarily not be necessary to constitute such officials corporate spokesmen."
10. See 8 WIGUORE § 2317(1). Compare In re Aspinwall, 2 Fed. Cas. 64, No. 591
(S.D.N.Y. 1874) with Matter of King v. Ashley, 179 N.Y. 281, 72 N.E. 106 (1904).
In Texas, by statute, the privilege extends to the client's communications and to "any
other fact which came to the knowledge of such attorney by reason of" his relationship
with his client. TEx. CoDE CRm. PROC. ANN. art. 713 (Supp. 1955).
11. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass.
1950) ("officers and employees"); Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792, 795
(D. Del. 1954) ("employees, officers, directors") ; cf. Stewart Equipment Co. v. Gallo,
32 N.J. Super. 15, 107 A.2d 527 (L. 1954) (privilege upheld for disclosure by vice-
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If the day-to-day legal affairs of corporations are to be carried forward in a
practical fashion, the director or officer should be permitted the privilege for
confidential disclosures bearing on corporate matters within the area of his
responsibility. 'Vith respect to directors still in office, it is hornbook law that
they are responsible for the corporation as a whole and should interest them-
selves in all its affairs. 12 Thus any disclosure on corporate matters by a di-
rector should qualify, even if the director is in fact inactive or a "dummy."
Where officers are concerned, the communication might have to come within
the speaker's proper area of responsibility in order to qualify as a corporate
confidence. The circle of officers is such a small one, however, that no substantial
harm would be risked in permitting the corporation to constitute any of its officers
a spokesman on all corporate legal affairs.
Disclosures by ex-directors and ex-officers might raise special problems.
There would perhaps have to be some showing that it had become necessary
for them to readopt the roles they had given up. It might be, for example, that
an ex-officer was the only source of information on certain matters with which
he had dealt during his term of office. Even so, a vote from the board might
be needed to reconstitute him a corporate confidant.
Suppose a director or officer makes a disclosure of personal misconduct in
regard to corporate matters. If the speaker is requesting purely personal legal
advice, or reasonably understands that he is to receive such advice, then the
privilege probably belongs to him personally rather than to the corporation.' 3
If the speaker later permitted repetition of the disclosure within the corporation,
he would be waiving his personal privilege. In short, it would be important to
determine whether the disclosure was a corporate or a personal one, or both,
in its inception-to determine, that is, on whose behalf the legal advice was
being sought.
president who was also sales manager; opinion seems to assume that director could also
qualify). It should be kept in mind that there may be less implied authority for directors
than for officers. Cf. Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 13 F.R-D. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
(corporate party not examinable through a director who was not an officer, because of
express language of FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d), which so provides because a corporation
cannot compel a director's attendance). To be on the safe side, counsel may wish to limit
his interviews with directors-absent a resolution by the board-to those who are also
officers.
12. E.g., BALLANTINE, CoRPoarlONS §§ 42, 62 (rev. ed. 1946).
13. Cf. Livezey v. United States, 279 Fed. 496, 499 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S.
721 (1922).
Quacre whether the lawyer for the corporation should knowingly allow himself to be
placed in such a position. Compare ABA, OPINIONS OF CommirEE ON PROFESSIONAL
E'rHICS AND GRIEVANCES 405 (1947) (corporate counsel should disclose to board of
directors information concerning wrongful acts of executive officers communicated to him
in course of their duties; such a disclosure would be "to the client itself and not to a
third person") with Cleveland Bar Ass'n, Ethics Committee Report, 25 Orio L. REP. 569
(1927) (corporate counsel may not disclose to board of directors confidential communica-
tion of employee who embezzled and then asked him as personal attorney for assistance
in making good the deficit).
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Employees
"Employees" range from the truck driver up to the division chief who is
about to become a vice-president; both of these may be authorized to speak
for the corporation on matters related to their duties. But to blanket all their
disclosures with the attorney-client privilege would keep a substantial volume of
information within the corpbration. In this area, therefore, the policy considera-
tions that favor restricting the circle of corporate spokesmen become particu-
larly urgent.
In the federal courts the chief doubt as to employees stems from Hicklman v.
Taylor 14 and its progeny.15 The Hickman case is well known for the qualified
immunity from federal pre-trial discovery that it afforded the "work product
of the attorney." It is less known for a statement, which may be viewed either
as dictum or as a preliminary part of the holding, that the material sought to
be discovered was not entitled to the protection of the attorney-client privi-
lege.16 That statement was apparently predicated on an assumption, shared
by the two lower courts,' 7 that an employee necessarily speaks as a third
party witness when he is interviewed by his employer's attorney.
In the Hickman case the client was a two-man partnership which owned
seven tugs. It had no claims department and no employees regularly charged
with investigation; its office force consisted of no more than three persons.
After one of the company's tugs had capsized, the partnership retained an
attorney in contemplation of pending litigation. He interviewed the four
crew members-all employees of the partnership-who had survived the acci-
dent. His reports and recollections of these interviews were among the ma-
terials the plaintiff sought to obtain.'8
All three courts assumed that the interviews were with "witnesses" or with
"third parties" and hence not within the attorney-client privilege.' 9 Nowhere
is there any mention of the possibility that the crew members, being employees,
14. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
15. See, generally, Note, 62 HARv. L. REV. 269 (1948).
16. 329 U.S. at 508, 516. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) and 34 permit depositions or discovery
as to designated matters, if "not privileged." The term "privileged" seems to be intended
in its traditional evidentiary sense. 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 26.22 (2d ed. 1950) ;
accord, Humphries v. Pennsylvania R.R., 14 F.R.D. 177, 181 (N.D. Ohio 1953) ; Wild v.
Payson, 7 F.R.D. 495, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). As to whether state law defining privilege
applies in diversity cases, see text at notes 30-31 infra.
17. 4 F.R.D. 479, 482 (E.D. Pa. 1945); 153 F.2d 212, 222 (3d Cir. 1945). Since
the district court sat en banc, no less than twenty-four federal judges in three courts
passed on the question and ruled against the common law privilege. Cf. Morgan, The
Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HAxv. L. R.v. 481, 518 (1946).
18. These facts are set forth in the district court's opinion, 4 F.R.D. 479, 481
(E.D. Pa. 1945). The two higher courts, to judge from their silence, may have considered
the structure of the partnership irrelevant.
19. See 4 F.R.D. at 481, 482; 153 F.2d at 222; 329 U.S. at 508, 518. It is noteworthy
that the common law privilege question seems to have disappeared from the case by the
time it reached the Supreme Court. Respondent, in a memorandum filed after the argu-
ment, merely argued that under a number of rather ancient cases the privilege did extend
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were speaking to the attorney on behalf of the partnership. It is conceivable
that the privilege was not applied because the client was a partnership rather
than a corporation, but there is no hint of this distinction in any of the
opinions. In short, the assumption seems to have been that only the two
partners could serve as the source for communications by the "client" to the
attorney.20
In contrast to the Hickman assumption regarding partnership employees is
Judge 'Wyzanski's illuminating opinion in United States v. United Shoe Ma-
chinery Corp.21 In an earlier case the government had subpoenaed quantities
of corporate records for grand jury inspection in an antitrust prosecution. The
grand jury refused to indict, and the records were returned. Then in a subse-
quent civil action a considerably broader subpoena demanded a large number
of letters to and from counsel which dealt, for the most part, with the company's
patent business. On a motion to quash or limit the subpoena, it was held,
inter alia, that "information furnished [to the attorney] by an officer or
employee of the defendant [corporation] in confidence and without the pres-
ence of third persons" may be privileged, but that "facts disclosed to the
attorney by a person outside the organization of defendant [corporation] and
its affiliates" are not.22 As support for the latter branch of his holding, Judge
Wyzanski cited Hickman for the classic rule as to "witnesses, ' 23 but did not
explain whether he meant that the "employees" here were different, or if so,
which employees might be considered "inside" the organization and which
"outside."
United Shoe and Hickman can be reconciled on their facts, but their doc-
trines seem to be in conflict, since one case stands for withholding the privilege
from employee statements, the other for extending it. Hickman might, for
instance, be taken as merely illustrating a reluctance to accord more than a
qualified protection to accident reports-which were not involved in United
Shoe. But many of the federal discovery cases citing Hickman as authority for
denying the privilege have failed to draw any clear distinctions either be-
to third party witnesses. Supplemental Memorandum for Respondent, pp. 2-3, Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
20. The district court added the refinement that the lawyer was "merely the medium
through which his client becomes apprised of facts." 4 F.R.D. at 482. The case could
perhaps be distinguished on the grounds that (a) the accident report was a business
record, see notes 90-92 infra and accompanying text; or (b) the lawyer was acting
in a non-legal capacity, i.e., as an investigator, see note 66 infra; or (c) the disclosure
was not made on behalf of the entity because the employees had claims of their own
pending, see note 116 infra. Ground (c) is the only one that seems to have merit on
the reported facts, and is perhaps slightly evoked by the statement that the crew members
were "third parties."
21. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
22. Id. at 359. (Emphasis added.)
23. Ibid. The pertinent portion of the page from Hickinaa v. Taylor cited by Judge
WVyzanski states, "For present purposes, it suffices to note that the protective cloak of this
[attorney-client] privilege does not extend to information which an attorney secures from
a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation." 329 U.S. at 508.
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tween various types of employees or between their different kinds of reports.2 4
On the other hand, it may be that Judge Wyzanski had in mind privi-
leged treatment only for the office help in contrast to "outside" drivers and
the like-or, even more likely, he was thinking of employees whose duties
involve such "inside" matters as asking for legal assistance or making mana-
gerial or policy decisions. If this was what he meant, he did not say so. Nor
did another distinguished district judge who recently followed United Shoe
in dealing with an application for production of some 1,600 corporate documents
in a private patent controversy. 25 His opinion says nothing of "inside" or
"outside" employees; instead, it can be read for the broad proposition that
any persons not "strangers"-that is, anyone "affiliated with the corporation
as employees, officers, directors"-are qualified to speak for the corporate
client.26
The state courts offer a contrast to Hickman v. Taylor; a long and respect-
able line of decisions have held that under the proper circumstances accident
reports of motormen, insurance agents, claims adjusters and the like may be
privileged when prepared for submission to company counsel with a view
to obtaining legal advice.27 These state cases deal indiscriminately with cor-
24. Privilege not applicable, citing Hickman v. Taylor: Humphries v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 14 F.R.D. 177, 178 (N.D. Ohio 1953) (accident reports of "employees, agents,
crew members and witnesses") ; Brookshire v. Pennsylvania R.R., 14 F.R.D. 154 (N.D.
Ohio 1953) (accident reports of engineer, conductor and supervisor of tracks); Cogdill
v. TVA, 7 F.R.D. 411, 414 (E.,D. Tenn. 1947) (accident report by defendant's driver;
privilege not to be recognized "ipso facto" under the rules) ; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Shields, 16 F.R.D. 5, 7, 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (dictum; reports by house counsel
referring to communications with "other than his [corporate] employer fall outside
the scope of the attorney-client privilege" but discovery denied on basis of work-product
rule); Portman v. America2 Home Products Corp., 9 F.R.D. 613, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1949)
(dictum; general counsel procured unprivileged statements from present and former
employees of subsidiary but discovery denied because no showing of necessity) ; cf.
Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953) ; Panella v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 14 F.R.D. 196 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
Privilege upheld without discussion: Gillig v. Bymart-Tintair, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 393
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikansche Stoomvaart-
Maatschappij, 15 F.R.D. 32, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
25. Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954) (Judge Leahy).
For the subsequent disposition of other documents in the same litigation, see 16 F.R.D.
356 (D. Del. 1954).
26. Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Del. 1954). See note
100 infra and accompanying text.
27. E.g., Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267 P.2d 1025 (1954) (routine
accident report by city motorman privileged because submission to counsel was "dominant
purpose"; dissent says test should be whether report would not have been prepared other-
wise), 1 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 605 (1954) (result supported); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Williams, 21 Ga. App. 453, 94 S.E. 584 (1917) (report on a standard printed form);
Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W2d 413 (1942) (employee's accident report
submitted to claims agent upon advice of and for use of counsel), 26 MINN. L. Rmr. 744
(1942) (result supported), 28 VA. L. Ray. 1133 (1942) (rule criticized) ; In re Hyde,
149 Ohio St. 407, 414, 79 N.E.2d 224, 227 (1948) (distinguishes between accident reports
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porations, partnerships and individual proprietorships, and seem to rely simply
on the logic of the ancient rule that the client may utilize an agent for his
communication to the attorney. For example, one relatively recent dictum
says broadly:
"A statement by the accredited agent of a corporation, giving his account
of how an accident occurred, and given for the use of counsel in pending
or threatened litigation is . . . privileged." 28
It is noteworthy that the state courts, while they have taken pains to define
the circumstances under which an accident report may be privileged, seem
to have been principally concerned with preventing ordinary business records
from masquerading as attorney-client communications. They do not suggest
and "matters of record with the company for general purposes" which the company
would have "irrespective of any accident") ; In re Klemann, 132 Ohio St. 187, 5 N.E.2d
492 (1936) (accident report of insured's employee forwarded to insurer and by insurer
to its attorney); Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906) (conductor's
accident report forwarded to corporation's claim agent for settlement or for use of counsel
in event of suit) ; Davenport Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 166 Pa. 480, 31 Atl. 245 (1895)
(local railroad agent's written report forwarded to his superior for delivery to counsel).
Compare the following cases, where the privilege was denied on grounds other than
the unprivileged status of employees: In re Keough, 151 Ohio St. 307, 310-11, 314, 85
N.E.2d 550, 552-54 (1949) (dictum in In re Hyde, supra, followed and information "from
the general records of the city which were made and kept without regard to any
accident" held subpoenable even though given to defense counsel in accordance with "a
custom of some years standing." Records that came into existence as the result of the
accident would be 'privileged in the hands of the city"; but the court's syllabus seems
to specify accident reports that are "turned over to and remain in the possession of the
company's legal department"); Colpak v. Hetterick, 40 F. Supp. 350 (E D.N.Y. 1941)
(investigation "by the [insurance) company itself and not by its attorney"); Wise v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 36 Del. 456, 178 Atl. 640 (Super. Ct. 1935) (report by one
branch office to another, with request that home office not be informed); Curtis v.
Indemnity Co., 327 Mo. 350, 37 S.W.2d 616 (1931) (letters between insurance company
and its adjustor prior to litigation) ; Davies v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Co., 68 N.E.2d 571,
579 (Ohio C.P. 1938), aff'd, 68 N.E.2d 231 (Ohio Ct. App. 1939) (Ex parne Schoepf,
supra, distinguished because documents not prepared "exclusively" for counsel and did not
remain in counsel's possession "continuously after their preparation") ; Savage v. Canadian
Pac. Ry., 16 MANITOBA L.R. 381 (1906) (accident report made on form headed "For the
information of the solicitor of the company and his advice thereon") ; cf. Hurley v. Con-
necticut Co., 118 Conn. 276, 172 Atl. 86 (1934) (dictum; motorman's report made for
preparation against possible but not pending litigation) ; Wolff v. Capital Transit Co., 35
A.2d 454 (D.C. Mun. App. 1944) (dictum; motorman's report). Additional cases are
collected in Annots., 139 A.L.R. 1250 (1942), 146 A.L.R. 977 (1943).
The accident report cases have been discussed at length by the commentators, though
not in regard to the specific problems of corporate counsel. See 8 WIGMORE § 2319
(largely English cases). Wigmore observes-erroneously, it would seem-that there has
been "very little development" in the United States. Id. at 624. See also 4 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 26.23(3) (2d ed. 1950) ; 1 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLiEs OF EvIDENCE
100-01 (1954) ; Comments, 21 U. CHI. L. Ray. 752 (1954), 88 U. PA. L. REv. 467 (1940);
Note, 1943 WIs. L. REv. 424.
28. Robertson v. Virginia, 181 Va. 520, 540, 25 S.E.2d 352, 360 (1943). See also
Stewart Equipment Co. v. Gallo, 32 N.J. Super. 15, 17, 107 A.2d 527, 528 (L. 1954)
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distinctions among the types of corporate agents, but seem rather to have as-
sumed that any employee might speak for the corporate client, provided his
disclosure was attributable to the intervention of the attorney acting in a legal
capacity. Hardly any of the recent state cases have seen fit to consider the
confliking assumption of Hickman v. Taylor-and perhaps of United Shoe as
well-that some employees can only speak as third-party witnesses.-" For
example, the state courts in Ohio have ignored the federal cases, while the
federal district courts in Ohio have expressly refused to follow the state rule
on accident reports.8 0
One can only conjecture what effect, if any, this conflict of authorities will
have on jurisdictions that are not yet committed on the question. As for the
federal courts, it may be that under federal procedure they are free to admit,
as unprivileged, disclosures that the state courts choose to protect.8 '
("Since a corporation can only act through its agent, it must necessarily follow that if
the attorney-client privilege is to extend to corporations, as it does,... it must necessarily
extend to confidential communications made by the agent of the corporation.").
29. But cf. Frank C. Sparks Co. v. Huber Baking Co., 114 A.2d 657, 660 n.4 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1955). A number of states have adopted the general "work product" concept
of Hickman v. Taylor, but it is not clear whether they would also agree that employees'
accident reports can never be anything more than "work product." E.g., Seaboard Air
Line Ry. v. Timmons, 61. So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1952) ; State ex rel. Terminal R. Ass'n v.
Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 257 S.W.2d 69 (1953).
30. See Ohio federal and state cases cited in notes 24 and 27, supra. But cf. Reeves
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 8 F.R.D. 616 (D. Del. 1949) (Delaware decisional law, rather
than Hickman v. Taylor, followed in diversity case, and privilege upheld for an accident
report); Blank v. Great Northern Ry., 4 F.R.D. 213 (D. Minn. 1943) (Minnesota
rule cited). See also Pennsylvania RIR. v. Julian, 10 F.R.D. 452 (D. Del. 1950) (routine
accident report admissible under both Hickman v. Taylor and local law). District Judge
Rodney, in the Reeves and Julian cases, supra, was following his own prior decision as a
Delaware judge. See Frank C. Sparks Co. v. Huber Baking Co., 114 A.2d 657, 660
(Del. Super Ct. 1955).
31. In criminal proceedings, the federal courts follow their own views of the common
law in defining evidentiary privileges. FED. R. CRim. P. 26; Petition of Borden Co.,
75 F. Supp. 857, 859-60 (N.D. Ill. 1948). In civil proceedings the situation is not so
clear. Apparently even in diversity cases the federal courts are not bound to follow state
judicial rules of privilege which exclude evidence. See Green, Federal Civil Procedure
Rule 43(a), 5 VAND. L. Rav. 560 (1952); 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACriCE ff 26.23[9] (2d ed.
1950). Moreover, with respect to federal civil discovery, the framers of the Federal
Rules seem to have contemplated an expanded procedure which would ordinarily operate
without regard to state restrictions. In Hickman v. Taylor, a Jones Act case, the opinion
remarks that "it is unnecessary here to delineate the content and scope of the [attorney-
client] privilege as recognized in the federal courts" and-apparently deliberately-
chooses to ignore the existence of conflicting state cases on accident reports. 329 U.S. at
508, 510 n.9. See also the Ohio district court cases cited in note 24 supra. Nevertheless,
there is some authority for the view that state statutory privileges which exclude evidence
may-or perhaps must-be followed in federal diversity cases. E.g., Palmer v. Fisher, 228
F.2d 603, 607-08 (7th Cir. 1955) (statutory privilege for accountants) ; Berdon v. McDuff,
15 F.R.D. 29 (E.D. Mich. 1953) (same). See, generally, Note, 5 VAND L. Ray. 590,
604-06 (1952) ; Green, The Admissibility of Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 55
HARv. L. REv. 197, 208-09 (1941).
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Nevertheless, the local rule may at least be persuasive in the detailed federal
application of either Hickman v. Taylor or United Shoe.
Suggested Analysis of the Employee Problem
I suggest that, for purposes of the privilege problem, corporate employees
and other agents can be classified as (1) managing agents, (2) communicating
agents, and (3) source agents.3 2 A managing agent, in this sense, is one who
has authority to undertake action or make decisions in regard to dealings with
corporate counsel. A communicating agent is one who simply forwards in-
formation. A source agent is one who is himself the source of the information
being disclosed or forwarded. All three capacities may be combined in one
individual. For example, a company claims adjuster, working with the com-
pany attorney, would be acting as a managing agent when he formulated
policies on the conduct of the litigation, the handling of negotiations or the
preparation of evidence. He would be acting as a communicating agent when
he interviewed the company motorman (a source agent) and turned over the
interview to counsel. He would be a source agent when he reported to counsel
on the motorman's demeanor or on his own inspection of the scene of the
accident.
I suggest that the principles of agency law are adequate for testing whether
managing agents or communicating agents are qualified as spokesmen for the
client, but are inadequate in regard to source agents.
Managing agents simply perform the same function for the corporation that
an individual client would ordinarily do for himself. In the words of an English
judge who upheld the privilege for communications from a corporate com-
mittee, "the corporation is perfectly justified in referring all these [legal]
matters to a committee and asking the committee to deal with them as it
would deal with them itself, and they are simply the agents of the
corporation for the purpose of considering what ought to be done. '3 3 The
rules of agency law should be used to test whether the corporation has
turned over the management of a particular legal consultation to the agent
in question. Indeed, no reason suggests itself why a subsequent ratification
or adoption of managerial action undertaken on the corporation's behalf
would not be sufficient.
When communicating agents are involved, the only restriction on the privi-
lege should be the principle of confidentiality, which requires that disclosure of
the information to the communicating agent be justified by necessity or other-
32. As to the distinction between communicating and source agents, see 1 MORGAN,
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 100-01 (1954); as to the term "managing agents," see
Comment, 50 MxcH. L. REV. 308, 310 (1951). For an interesting illustration of a com-
bined managing, communicating and (perhaps) source agent for individual plaintiffs, see
Danisch v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 18 F.R.D. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
33. Mayor & Corp. of Bristol v. Cox, 26 Ch. D. 678, 682 (1884). Accord, Lalance
& Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 87 Fed. 563, 564 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1898).
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wise consistent with the alleged desire for secrecy.34 Subject to this require-
ment, there is no reason why a stenographer, interpreter, or the United States
mails (in the sense that letters would be privileged) could not be authorized
to forward information on behalf of the corporation, or why such forwarding
could not be ratified or adopted by the corporation. Thus an agent could be
empowered to interview directors and submit this material to counsel, when
distance, convenience, or some other reason made this form of communication
appropriate. The information should be treated as privileged, since the agent
has intervened only as a forwarding channel for corporate spokesmen. On
the other hand, even a professional company interviewer could not convert
interviews with third party witnesses into privileged communications any
more than the ordinary client could.
It is where the third person is himself the source of the information that a
mere authority to disclose on behalf of the client is not always sufficient to
change his true colors from witness to client. At the very least, the informa-
tion disclosed for the client by the source agent should have been obtained
in the necessary course of his agency; a client should not be permitted to
expand the scope of "his" protected confidences indefinitely either by authorizing
others to make disclosures to his attorney or by ratifying such disclosures
after they are made.35 Only the exigencies of a business that necessarily carries
34. The same requirement of confidentiality is at work when a communicating agent
-such as an interpreter or stenographer-is present at a conference between client and
attorney. Cf. Bowers v. State, 29 Ohio St. 542, 546 (1916) ; State v. Loponio, 85 N.J.L.
357, 362, 88 Att. 1045, 1047-48 (1913) ; see pp. 982-84 infra.
Presumably no special showing of necessity would be required when the United
States mails or a messenger are used to forward a sealed communication to the attorney,
since there has been no disclosure to the communicating agent. However, the privilege
does not prevent testimony by a third party who, unbeknownst to client or attorney,
intercepts a confidential communication. E.g., Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. App. 187,
261 S.W.2d 339 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 855 (1953) (eavesdropping on long-distance
call by telephone operator), 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1295 (1954) (ruling criticized), 32 TExAS
L. IEv. 615 (1954) (same); Erlich v. Erlich, 278 App. Div. 244, 104 N.Y.S.2d 531
(1st Dep't 1951) (wiretap) ; State v. Perry, 4 Idaho 224, 38 Pac. 655 (1894). This is
generally rationalized by the argument that it is up to the parties to the confidence to
assure privacy, see 8 WIGMORE § 2326, but this notion-akin to contributory negligence-
is hard to reconcile with the view that the privilege is intended as protection for the
client's freedom of communication with his attorney, rather than as a kind of prize for
diligence.
35. Wigmore describes a communication from a "third person" as unprivileged even
though it is "for the benefit of the client," whereas a communication "originating with
the client's agent" is considered privileged. 8 Wcmom § 2317, at 616. This section
of Wigmore is cited in United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 359, but only for the "third person"
portion of the rule. Quaere whether Wigmore means that the client can always
authorize a third person to speak for him and thereby constitute him as "agent." More
likely, he has in mind an authorized speaker who is already an agent with respect to
other matters. See, e.g., 8 WIGMORE § 2319, at 618-19: "[T]he more clearly the com-
municator is a stranger to the parties, the more plainly he falls without the privilege;




out its activities and discloses its accumulated information through agents,
should suffice to justify judicial protection of source agent-attorney dis-
closures. 30 In the case of a corporate client, the nature of the entity, the num-
ber of its source agents and the role they play in its operations, would all
seem relevant to the result.
As to source agents, the "work product" formula suggested by the Hickman
case is inadequate. Under the rationale of that decision, protection of employee
statements-like those of any other witness-would be limited to disclosures
made in preparation for litigation and would depend on the wavering lines of
"attorney's work product"; in addition, the protection would be conditional
on the need of the person seeking the disclosure.3 7 Yet there seems ample
reason to afford a higher degree of protection to confidences of employees than
to those of ordinary witnesses.
Two general lines of approach are available to put reasonable bounds on
the privilege of source agents: limit strictly the type of records that will be
protected, as the state courts suggest; or else treat only selected employees
as qualified source agents, as United Shoe suggests. A practical solution
would be to imbue the state cases with United Shoe. Thus, all employees
could be allowed to act as source agents, but any documents prepared by or
in reliance on motormen, drivers, and other lower-ranking source agents not
identified with management would be treated as prima facie business records
and ordinarily denied the privilege, unless the company affirmatively demon-
strated the significance of the lawyer's intervention in the making of the
record.
It should be borne in mind that the suggested protection for reports which at
the corporate lawyer's direction are obtained from source agents would in no way
draw the mantle of privilege over the knowledge of such agents, apart from
the report to counsel. This should be true even where the source agent
acquires his knowledge as a result of an investigation instituted at the at-
torney's behest. Conceivably, the Hickman "work product" rule may extend
to protect the thinking processes not only of attorneys but also of certain of
their expert advisers or assistants,38 but the common law never extended such
protection to the client's thoughts.
36. The labor union that intervened as amicus curiae in Hicknm v. Taylor urged
that employers should not be permitted to insulate the reports of their employees against
discovery. Brief for United R.R. Workers, p. 5, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
Mr. Justice Murphy was prompted to advert to the possible danger of a "dark veil" of
corporate secrecy, but concluded that it was "unsatisfactory" to frame the problem of dis-
covery "in terms of assisting individual plaintiffs in their suits against corporate defend-
ants." 329 U.S. at 506-07. Perhaps he meant that it was more satisfactory to decide that
all employees are "witnesses" without giving the reason.
37. See, generally, Tame, Discovery of Trial Preparations in the Federal Courts,
50 COLUm. L. Rav. 1026, 1053-62 (1950); Note, 62 HARv. L. REv. 269 (1948); 4 MooRx,
FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 26.23 passim (2d ed. 1950). Compare notes 87, 89 infra.
38. See, e.g., Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21. (W.D. Pa.
1940).
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In this respect there would theoretically be an important distinction between
a communicating agent and a source agent. Any attempt to question a mere
communcating agent about "knowledge" obtained from the client would, by
definition, be an improper effort to elicit the privileged report to the attorney.
But in practice, things may not work out so neatly. In the first place, difficul-
ties may arise in pigeonholing thoughts of a corporate communicating agent
who acquires knowledge of his own in the course of transmitting information
for others. Suppose that at the attorney's prompting an officer of the com-
pany shows an investigator around the plant and makes confidential disclosures
in regard to its observed physical operations, which are to be communicated to
the attorney. It seems fairly clear that the investigator cannot be questioned
about his report to counsel, whether he be viewed as source or as communicating
agent. However, the sum total of his own knowledge has increased. Can he
be questioned about that knowledge, or would the questions necessarily go to
the communication from the corporate source-the officer-to the attorney?"9
Apart from the classification problem, there is the question whether the
immunity of a communicating agent is anything more than a kind of best
evidence rule. Suppose an officer who was the source agent is dead or un-
available, and the only way of tracking down what he said is to question the
company investigator who relayed his story to the attorney. Similar hard
cases may arise with individual clients, but the likelihood is multiplied as the
number and kinds of source agents increase. One might expect a court,
when confronted with such a case, to lean towards a finding that the missing
officer was not making a disclosure prompted by the need for legal advice. If
the original source were only an employee instead of an officer, the court
might decide that he spoke as "witness" rather than as "client." Alternatively,
there would be a temptation to equate the investigator to a source agent who
could be questioned about his knowledge, particularly where his two functions
were intermingled.
All these considerations suggest strongly that if the lawyer wishes to
minimize his risks he would do well to interview the source officer or em-
ployee himself wherever he can.
Stockholders
There seem to be no American cases dealing with the status of stockholders
as privileged spokesmen for the corporation. Of course, corporate counsel
might consult with a stockholder alone as his personal attorney, or the stock-
holder might reasonably believe this to be the case. Again, where both stock-
holder and corporation are interested in a legal problem, the stockholder and
officers of the corporation could enter upon a joint consultation with corporate
39. Cf. San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951) (doctor
acted as "intermediate agent" in examining client for attorney; held: both the doctor's
observations and the client's disclosures were protected by client-attorney privilege.
Were the disclosures inextricably intertwined?).
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counsel for the purpose of receiving legal advice upon a common problem.40
And the stockholder, like anyone else, could be employed by the corporation
as a communicating agent to forward information from the corporation to
its attorney, or as a managing agent to direct litigation and consult with
counsel. In all these cases the stockholder's communications to the attorney
could be privileged.
But what of the case where corporate counsel interviews the stockholder,
alone or with officers of the company, as a source of information for formu-
lating legal advice to the company? It is at least arguable that the proper
management of corporate affairs requires encouragement of confidences be-
tween stockholders and corporate attorneys in regard to those corporate
activities in which the stockholder often plays a vital role: formation of the
corporation, annual meetings, elections of directors, ratification of by-laws,
approval of actions of the board, and the like. However, the cases dealing with
employees suggest that the courts will go no further than the rules of agency
in deciding who may speak for the client. If agency is a minimum re-
quirement, an assertion of the privilege might founder on the hornbook rule
that a stockholder is not an agent of the corporation and may not bind it in
tort or in contract.4 ' Accordingly, under a strict agency theory, except perhaps
where the stockholder dominated the corporation or it was otherwise appro-
priate to pierce the corporate veil, 42 an interview with a stockholder on the
part of corporate counsel would be treated as an interview with an outsider.
Still, it appears that a shareholder vote may amount to a binding admission
against interest by the corporation.43  Even a single shareholder may enforce
40. As to joint consultations by individual clients, see text following note 111 infra.
It is sometimes said that an attorney need represent only one of the persons present, but
this probably means only that he need not be retained or paid by both, it being enough
that all persons present reasonably believe they are to be given legal advice on a mutual
problem. Compare Hartness v. Brown, 21 Wash. 655, 667, 59 Pac. 491, 494 (1889)
(formal representation of both not necessary if there is a mutual problem and mutual
trust) with Vance v. State, 190 Tenn. 521, 527, 230 S.W.2d 987, 990, cert. denied, 339
U.S. 9S3 (1950) (unprivileged because defendant had other counsel and there was no
"joint defense"). As to the related problem of inter-attorney exchanges of information,
see Note, 63 YALE L.J. 1030 (1954).
41. See, generally, BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 118, 124-26 (rev. ed. 1946).
42. Cf. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D.
Mass. 1950) :
"For present purposes the client is United Shoe Machinery Corporation and all its
subsidiaries and affiliates considered collectively. These corporations all used the
same outside and inside counsel. The legal affairs of these corporations were closely
related. Except for convenience in billing and formal accounting there was no
attempt to regard one particular corporation as 'the client.' "
43. Cf. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349, 352-53 (D.
Mass. 1950); Clarke v. Warwick Cycle Mfg. Co., 174 Mass. 434, 435, 54 N.E. 887, 888
(1899). But cf. 2 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 748 (1.954 ed.) : "[T]he ad-
missions or declarations of individual stockholders or members are not admissible against
the corporation unless they are acting as its agents in the matter and are authorized to
do so."
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corporate rights in a representative action, and his vote may complete or
permit desired corporate action. Thus, the shareholder's status is, in reality,
neither that of agent nor that of "outsider," but something in between.
Indeed, shareholders might be entitled to inspect opinions of corporate counsel
along with other corporate records, unless such an opinion was prepared to
aid the board of directors in litigation against the shareholder.44 If this is true,
it is hard to see how one who has the right to inspect the corporate counsel's
opinions can be an outsider for the purposes of gathering information used
in composing those opinions.
Perhaps the solution would be to employ the familiar distinction between
the shareholder acting in his personal and in his corporate capacity. In matters
relating to his own rights, or to claims adverse to the corporation, he could
not speak as someone "within" the organization; in matters relating to action
taken in his stockholder capacity in coordination with that of directors and
officers, he could so speak. One old English decision 45 appears to hold that
information communicated to corporate counsel by a group of shareholders,
who were acting on behalf of the corporation, was privileged. In that case
a committee of three-two shareholders and one ex-shareholder-were acting
on behalf of all shareholders in settling creditors' claims against a financially
embarrassed company. In a suit brought by the creditors, the privilege was
held to immunize from discovery letters to the company solicitors from the
committee and from individual stockholders, on the ground that these were
direct communications from a party to his solicitor in regard to a pending
action. On the other hand, discovery of letters exchanged between the com-
mittee and other shareholders and directors was permitted, on the ground that
letters bet-ween the parties themselves, or from a stranger to a party, are not
privileged even though written to be forwarded to the recipient's solicitor.
"Professional privilege," said the court, "is a ground of exemption from pro-
duction adopted simply from necessity ... and ought to extend no further
than absolutely necessary to enable the client to obtain professional advice
with safety." 46
The ruling as to letters sent by one party to another for forwarding to the
attorney is probably not the law in England today, since a party may employ
a communicating agent at least when necessary.47 But the exclusionary ruling
still seems significant because it illustrates the degree to which even a court
that construes the privilege narrowly may assume that in certain circumstances
the stockholder speaks for the corporation. Yet the case is perhaps distinguish-
44. This argument seems to have been rejected in Mayor & Corp. of Bristol v. Cox,
26 Ch. D. 678, 683-84 (1884), but the case is distinguishable because the action was one
brought by a city corporate body against a ratepayer for slander of title, i.e., for a wrong
committed in his individual capacity. Compare the rule as to trust beneficiaries. 2 ScOTT,
TRusTs § 173 (1939).
45. Glyn v. Caulfield, 3 McN. & G. 463, 42 Eng. Rep. 339 (Ch. 1851).
46. Id. at 474, 42 Eng. Rep. at 343-44.
47. See 8 WiGMoRE §§ 2317-19.
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able. The stockholders may have been personally liable on the company's
debts, in which event perhaps they rather than the company were the real
parties and the real clients. Moreover, it does not appear whether the letters
protected by the court merely contained a request for advice by managing
agents on behalf of the company, or also contained information supplied by the
stockholders from their own knowledge as source agents. It is the latter
case alone that gives us pause.
In the absence of controlling decisions on this point, it would be a rash
corporate attorney who acted on the assumption that his interviews with or
in the presence of important and influential stockholders were necessarily
within the privilege. Such an assumption is safe, if ever, only where it is clear
that advice is being rendered to the stockholder personally as well as to the
company. Short of that situation, however, corporate counsel should treat
stockholders as outside witnesses unless it becomes imperative to take the risk
here described.
THE LAWYER'S ROLE
It is a basic principle that the privilege extends only to confidential com-
munications made by the client to his lawyer acting as such. Accordingly,
it does not protect disclosures made to a person who happens to be a lawyer
but is not acting in that capacity.48 This aspect of the privilege raises difficulties
when applied to lawyers who, as advisers to businessmen, participate in busi-
ness decisions. The problem is particularly perplexing for the legal advisers
of today's corporate giants. As it recently appeared in the examination of one
bemused witness in regard to a claim of privilege by lawyers who handled
contract negotiations for RCA, the negotiations "may have been carried on
in their [the lawyers'] capacity as businessmen, but they were lawyers never-
theless .... They sort of left their footprints all over this picture." 49 Indeed,
corporate attorneys are often employees, directors, or officers of their clients.
Whether they be "outside" counsel or "house" counsel, they can rarely con-
fine themselves to purely legal matters. Questions of policy, as well as execu-
tive guidance for matters that are partly legal, often fall within their domain.
There is hardly a corporate record or memorandum of any importance that
does not pass through their hands at one time or another. Their key position
in the business was succinctly stated by an anonymous "Wall Street lawyer":
"Your modern corporate lawyer is a member of the command staff of a
corporation .... It's like the organization of an army. We like to think
of the legal division as G-2.' '
The privilege problems thus presented will be considered in terms of (1)
house counsel, (2) lawyer businessmen, and (3) corporate records.
48. Sid.§§2296,2300.
49. RCA v. Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440, 443 (N.D. Ill. 1955). The witness was
David Sarnoff, Chairman of the Board of RCA.
50. Mayer, The Wall Street Lawyers, Harper's Magazine, Jan. 1956, pp. 31, 35.
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House Counsel
It is a common arrangement for a corporation to employ at least one member
of the bar who receives periodic salary, uses its facilities, and works only for
it. "House counsel," as he is termed, generally works at the home office but
deals with the company's legal problems all over the country. Sometimes he is
not admitted to the local bar in the state where the home office is located,
since outside attorneys would be retained in the event of litigation or other
problems requiring local specialists. Although usually considered an employee,
he is by the ethics of the profession an independent contractor in the sense
that his employment by the corporation should not give it the right to super-
vise his legal activities. But frequently his position as employee involves
duties other than those of a legal adviser. What has been the courts' attitude
toward the assertion of the attorney-client privilege for confidential communi-
cations between the corporation and its house counsel?
In United Shoe, Judge Wyzanski rejected out of hand the argument that
house counsel was not qualified as an attorney for the purpose of the privilege.
He pointed out, quite correctly, that the
"type of service performed by house counsel is substantially like that
performed by many members of the large urban law firms. The distinction
is chiefly that the house counsel gives advice to one regular client, the
outside counsel to several regular clients."',
A number of federal courts have recently taken the same position,52 and several
51. 89 F. Supp. at 360. But see Tweed, The Changing Practice of Law, 11 PcoRn
oF Ass'N OF BAR OF CITY OF N.Y. 13, 20-21 (Jan. 1956) (14th Annual Cardozo Lecture,
delivered Oct. 27, 1955):
"The accusation that the big law firm becomes the creature of big business has
been thoroughly answered many times. Logically, it is perfectly clear that the larger
the law firm the more clients and more business it will have. And then no one client
can mean as much financially. . . . Admittedly the situation is entirely different
with respect to lawyers on the staff and payroll of a corporation. Not only is the
corporation their sole source of income but because they have confined themselves
to such limited work they have greatly reduced the possibilities of ever standing on
their own legal feet."
Nevertheless, it is not unusual for a senior associate in a large law firm handling a
corporate account to move over into the position of house counsel-and it may be doubted
that his attitude is different, in any respect relevant here, as a result of the change.
52. Georgia-Pac. Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) ("House counsel are required to have the same degree of training, skill,
knowledge and professional integrity as outside counsel.") cf. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Shields, 16 F.R.D. 5, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ("house counsel" qualifies as an attorney
under "work product" rule) ; Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55, 58
(N.D. Ohio 1953) (same).
In Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954) Judge Leahy
observed: "There is a privilege only if: . . . [T]he person to whom the communication
was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court or his immediate subordinate and (b)
is acting as a lawyer in connection with this communication. 'Outside counsel' for corpora-
tions almost invariably, and 'house counsel' ordinarily, qualify under this requirement."
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state courts have assumed it sub silentio.53 Accordingly, the privileged position
of house counsel seems relatively assured. Nevertheless, several caveats are
in order.
First, as to membership in the local bar when the corporation functions
throughout the country: In United Shoe, the chief of the company's patent
department at the home office in Massachusetts was an attorney admitted to
the Massachusetts bar, and it was claimed that communications to and from
the patent department qualified for the privilege. Judge Wyzanski rejected
the claim, principally because "all the men in the [patent] department function
less as detailed legal advisers than as a branch of an enterprise founded on
patents." 54 In coming to this conclusion, Judge Wyzanski relied in part on
Qvaere whether the hesitation implied by the word "ordinarily" referred to requirement
(b) as well as (a).
Compare the remarks on house counsel for the TVA in Cogdill v. TVA, 7 F.R.D.
411, 414, 415 (E.D. Tenn. 1947):
"[Ift is not clear whether the client-attorney or the employer-employee relationship
is dominant....
"In a government agency .... large and extensively departmentalized, with a
coordinator, or general manager, and a board of directors, it seems reasonable to
suppose that no complex matter of information would be exclusively obtained by
or become the exclusive property of a single department, but would be the achieve-
ment and the property of the over-all unit; that the members of the legal staff
would not be free and independent attorneys in the usual sense, but, like the in-
formation in their files, subject to the beck and call of their employer, whom
otherwise they call their client. The interrogatories are addressed to the parties,
not to their attorneys, and can be responded to without infringing the trust inherent
in a pure attorney-client relationship."
After additional affidavits were filed, the court observed that it was "particularly im-
pressed by so much of the supplemental affidavits as tend to show that the status of
counsel for defendant is that of autonomous attorneys. . . ."Id. at 15.
()uaere what treatment should be accorded communications to an "outside" attorney
made by "house counsel" as to matters of their own knowledge. Cf. Leonia Amusement
Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 438, 440, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (appears to treat such
communications as if made by the corporate client) ; Georgia-Pac. Plywood Co. v. United
States Plywood Corp., supra, ("house counsel" treated, by concession, as qualified manag-
ing and communicating agent to "outside" counsel; concession was apparently made-
without avail-in order to have "house counsel" treated solely as an employee).
53. E.g., In re Hyde, 149 Ohio St. 407, 413, 79 N.E.2d 224, 227 (1948); it re
Keough, 151 Ohio St. 307, 314-15, 85 N.E.2d 550, 553-54 (1949). But see Wise v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 36 Del. 456, 457, 178 Atl. 640, 644 (Super. Ct. 1935):
"In view of our conclusion [that the documents were not prepared to obtain legal
advice] it may be unnecessary to consider the standing that a Legal Department of
a defendant corporation would have in connection with the privilege accorded to
communications with an attorney. It may be somewhat doubtful if that privilege,
which had its origin in the relation of attorney and client, applies to transactions
between two branches of an elaborate corporate structure. If the privilege be ac-
corded it may conflict with the rule that upon interrogatories a corporate officer
answers not only from his own information but also from that of other officers
of the company."
Cf. 4 MOORE, Fr.r AL PRACticE ff 26.23[3] at 1105 (2d ed. 1950).
54. 89 F. Supp. at 360.
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the fact that some of the assistants in the patent department either were not
attorneys or were not admitted to the Massachusetts bar.5 As a result, the
decision has sometimes been thought to mean that house counsel must be ad-
mitted to the local bar to qualify for the privilege.56 Yet the lack of such
admission would only show that he was not qualified to advise on local law.
It should not prevent him from acting as legal adviser on federal law, or on
the law of the state where he was admitted, or on general problems common
to all jurisdictions.
Judge Wyzanski was probably using the lack of local admission as little more
than a make-weight. Such, at least, appears to be the interpretation recently
given to United Shoe by Judge Leahy, who had this to say on the subject of
local admission by house counsel in the RCA case:
"Bar membership should properly be of the court for the area wherein
the services are rendered, but this is not a sine qua non, e.g., visiting
counsel, long distance services by correspondence, pro hac vice services,
'house counsel' who practice law only for the corporate client and its
affiliates and not for the public generally, for which local authorities
do not insist on admission to the local bar." 7
Judge Kaufman, following Judge Leahy's view, has upheld the privilege for
"house counsel" who was not admitted to the bar of his home office but spent
a substantial part of his time travelling about the country; to hold otherwise,
he ruled, would be "to blind ourselves to the realities which exist in the repre-
sentation of a corporation national in scope with litigation reaching into
many states."53
55. "The fact that they [persons in the patent department admitted to the bar outside
Massachusetts) though resident in Massachusetts and regularly working here, have never
received a license to practice law here shows that these regular employees are not acting
as attorneys for United. (The situation would be different with regard to a visiting
attorney from another state, for whom the privilege might well be invoked.)" Ibid.
56. See 1 MORGAN, BASIC PRoBLE s OF EvmENcE 99 n.1. (1954); Note, 5 VAND. L.
REv. 590, 592 (1952) ; cf. Kent Jewelry Corp. v. Kiefer, 202 Misc. 778, 782, 113 N.Y.S.2d
12, 17, 18 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (refers with approval to attorneys and their clients "from
other jurisdictions" and to an attorney "duly licensed by the state"-but what state?).
Quaere whether it is the law of the forum state, or of the state of admission to the bar, or
of the place where the consultation occurs, that governs the determination of the privilege.
Cf. Application of Franklin Washington Trust Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. 1956)
(New York law governs upon application in New York to take testimony of New York
lawyer for use in pending New Jersey proceeding; opinion stresses the forum's interest in
barring any disclosure).
57. Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954). Judge Leahy
stated nonetheless that his rulings "rest" on United Shoe, which was "closely followed."
Ibid. The divergence from United Shoe was made more explicit in Georgia-Pac. Ply-
wood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). There Judge
Kaufman, holding that "house counsel" need not be admitted to the local bar, observed
that in United Shoe "I believe the court was using non-membership in the bar as merely
one factor. . . It does not indicate that there should be automatic exclusion from the
privilege when the attorney is not licensed in the state." Id. at 465.
58. Id at 466. The home office was located in New York State, and Judge Kaufman
referred in passing to the possible application of New York penal sanctions, which he
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A second caveat also stems from Judge Wyzanski's ruling, quoted above,
with regard to the patent department of United Shoe. Such patent attorneys,
in "an enterprise founded on patents," were said to be "comparable to the
employees with legal training who serve in the mortgage or trust departments
of a bank or in the claims department of an insurance company."' 9 Would
this reasoning require nonprivileged status for the legal department of an
enterprise founded on litigation, such as a claims collection agency? If so,
how would one distinguish the legal department from the company's regular
outside counsel?
Finally, in a case where too much valuable evidence would be insulated
by the privilege being accorded to house counsel, a court might be disposed
to find that house counsel was actually functioning in a business capacity. 60
Although no opinion has so indicated, in such a case the mere physical prox-
imity of house counsel, and the relative ease with which he could be converted
into a privileged sanctuary for corporate records, could be used to distinguish
him from outside counsel. House counsel who wishes his client to enjoy the
privilege might therefore do well to segregate his business activities insofar
as practicable, perhaps by keeping a log, time sheets or other records of those
matters in which he was consulted for legal advice.
Lawyer-Businessmen
Under some circumstances any lawyer may be acting not as an attorney
but rather as a businessman. The courts, in line with this distinction, have
denied the privilege where a communication was made to a lawyer who was
found to be acting as a business manager ;O1 a negotiator of real estate deals,62
deemed irrelevant. Id. at 465. See N.Y. PrEN. CoDE §§ 270, 271; Fein v. Ellenbogen, 84
N.Y.S.2d 787 (lst Dep't 1948) (unlawful for out-of-state attorneys to confer with
client in New York and prepare agreements concerning real estate) ; Matter of N.Y. Co.
Lawyers Ass'n (Anonymous), 207 Misc. 698, 139 N.Y.S.2d 714 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (unlawful
for Mexican lawyer to maintain N.Y. office and offer adivce on Mexican divorces.).
59. 89 F. Supp. at 360. Compare the reference to corporate claim departments in
4 MOoRE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE f1 26.23[8] at 1137 (2d ed. 1950).
60. Of course the scope of an attorney's employment is always relevant on this
issue. See State v. Addington, 158 Kan. 276, 284, 147 P.2d 367, 374 (1944) (attorney
retained only for "specific" rather than "general" advice); Humphries v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 14 F.R.D. 177, 178 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
61. United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751, 753 (D. Del. 1943).
Here the attorney was also acting as director, promotor and business manager of his
corporate client, with which he shared office space. With respect to certain letters from
the attorney to his client on price structure, Judge Leahy observes: "This is more than
attorney-talk. It is big-as well as basic-business diction." Ibid. Note that certain other
letters from the same attorney were nevertheless excluded as privileged. Ibid.
62. Avery v. Lee, 117 App. Div. 244, 102 N.Y. Supp. 12 (1st Dep't 1907) (individual
client's letter and cablegrams held not privileged against discovery because they related
only to the negotiating authority conferred upon attorney); cf. United States v. De
Vasto, 52 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1931) (transactions were "simple transfers of title to real
estate rather than consultations for legal advice," and were "steps in the criminal con-
spiracy" besides).
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loans 03 or contracts ;64 an accountant ;65 a professional investigator ;OO a bank
63. Lifschitz v. O'Brien, 143 App. Div. 180, 127 N.Y. Supp. 1091 (2d Dep't 1911)
(attorney employed by individual defendant to procure loan; conversations with defendant
going to the relation of principal and agent held admissible).
64. RCA v. Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1955). The negotiations here
were between corporations and were handled by attorneys who represented each corpora-
tion separately. Held: individual documents to be produced in those instances "where the
attorney was acting in the capacity of negotiator, or in any capacity other than advising a
client on legal matters." Id. at 444. Accord, Myles E. Rieser, Co. v. Lowe's Inc., 194
Misc. 119, 81 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (pages and paragraphs of attorneys' letters
dealing with negotiations held unprivileged and, for the same reason, not "work product"
within Hickman v. Taylor; but portions of letters containing counsel's advice held
privileged).
65. Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1954) (information
given by individual client for use by attorney-accountant in preparing tax returns and net
worth statements held not privileged); In re Fisher, 51 F.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931)
(information given by individual client for use by attorney-accountant in preparing fin-
ancial statements held not privileged even though data also used for legal advice).
Suppose the communication were by the client to the attorney's accountant? See
Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 939, 946 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
860 (1949) (accountant retained by attorney treated as "third party" for purposes of
privilege; the court found, however, that he was not functioning as an indispensable
assistant to the attorney in the formulation of legal advice). See also Gariepy v. United
States, 189 F.2d 459, 463-64 (6th Cir. 1951) (dictum that accountant employed by
attorney i& not entitled to the privilege). Contra, Walsham v. Stainton, 2 H. & M. 1,
71 Eng. Rep. 357 (Ch. 1863) (accountant treated as alter ego of attorney for purposes
of the privilege). For cases applying the alter ego concept to scientific and other expert
advisers of the attorney, see, in general, 70 C.J., Witnesses § 538 (1935). Compare
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr. § 353, which extends the privilege to a clerk, stenographer, or
"other person employed by ... [the client's] attorney"; 8 WIG2MoRE § 2301 n.1, denies that
this statute does any more than codify the common law. Does the alter ego rule mean
that the privilege is lost if the expert to whom the corporation communicates is employed
by it rather than by the attorney? See Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg.
Co., 87 Fed. 563 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1898) (suggests that expert is privileged when speaking
for the corporate client in so far as he acts as assistant to counsel, and not as a witness).
See also cases relating to experts or special agents employed by client collected in Annot.,
139 A.L.R. 1250, 1256-58 (1942).
It should be borne in mind that we have only been considering the privileged status
of the client's communications to the attorney's expert. The status of the expert's own
report or knowledge (under common law privilege or federal "work product") deserves
a separate article. It may be noted in passing, however, that where communications
from the expert are involved, privilege may conceivably depend on whether he is
considered as the agent of the client or of the attorney. But cf. 8 WIGIORE § 2317, at 617:
"[T]he communications of the attorney's agent to the attorney are within the privilege,
because the attorney's agent is also the client's sub-agent and is acting as such for the
client."
66. See O'Neill v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 827, 829 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (FBI
agents are not legal advisers to the government and statements taken by them from
witnesses are therefore not "work product") rev'd on other grounds sub nown. Alltmont
v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949). See also the' opinion of the district court
in Hickiian v. Taylor: "In taking down what various witnesses told him about the
case [the attorney] was acting primarily as an investigator." 4 F.R.D. at 482. But fact-
finding is usually the first task of the lawyer. The lower court in Hickman seems to have
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executive ;67 a corporate record custodian ;68 and a would-be investor. 69 Each
of these cases, so stated, fits well enough within the conventional rule that the
privilege extends only to the attorney acting as attorney. But few of them
provide much guidance for predicting the result where a lawyer mixes to-
gether business and legal activities.
In United Shoe, Judge WNryzanski faced this problem squarely. In attempting
to explain the basis for his labels, he was aided by the fact that the case in-
volved both categories of lawyers: the unprivileged businessman-lawyer and
the privileged lawyer-businessman. He held that the company's patent de-
partment fell into the first category; house counsel and outside counsel into
the latter. The distinction between them was framed in terms of a "time" test.
Thus, as to the patent department Judge Wyzanski observed:
"Grist which comes to their mill has a higher percentage of business con-
tent than legal content. . . . So far as the proferred, evidence in this
case shows, the principal topics on which they spend time are questions
of business policy, of competition as disclosed by facts derived from
third persons, of the scope of public patents. . . . They have not been
shown to spend most of their time on the application of rules of law
to facts which are known only to [the company's] employees. ' ' 70
On the other hand, of outside counsel and, by implication, house counsel as
well, he had this say:
"They were not acting as business advisers or officers of United, even
though occasionally their recommendations had in addition to legal points
sonie economic or policy or public relations aspect and hence were not
unmixed opinions of law. The modern lawyer almost invariably advises
his client upon not only what is permissible but also what is desirable.
had in mind that the accident report was really a routine business record even though
prepared by counsel. See note 92 infra and accompanying text. As to whether lawyers
who are employed as claims agents are acting in a legal capacity, for the purposes of
the "work product" rule, see 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcricE ff 26.23[8], at 1136-38 (2d ed.
1950).
67. United States v. Chin Lim Mow, 12 F.R.D. 433, 434 (NjD. Cal. 1952) (business
records in attorney's possession).
68. People v. Allen, 47 Cal. App. 2d 735, 746, 118 P.2d 927, 933 (1941) (attorney
was also corporation's statutory agent). Cf. People v. Eiseman, 78 Cal. App. 223, 245, 248
Pac. 716, 725 (1926) (no privilege for attorney's employee who served as clerk, book-
ketper, and cashier for the company whose papers she identified).
69. State v. Addington, 158 Kan. 276, 286, 147 P.2d 367, 374 (1944).
70. 89 F. Supp. at 360-61. (Emphasis added.) Compare Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA,
121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954), where Judge Leahy observed that attorney-
employees of the patent department "may or may not qualify in specific instances. They
do, for example, when in specific matters they are engaged in applying rules of law to
facts known only to themselves and other employees of their client-companies. .... "
Accord, Georgia-Pac. Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 465
(S.D.N.X. 1956): "To the extent that particular communications were largely concerned
with opinions on law, legal services or assistance in some legal proceeding, Mr. Heilman
[head of the "Legal and Patent Department"] was acting as an attorney .. "
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And it is in the public interest that the lawyer should regard himself as
more than predicter of legal consquences. His duty to society as well as
to his client involves many relevant social, economic, political and philo-
sophical considerations. And the privilege of nondisclosure is not lost
merely because relevant nonlegal considerations are expressly stated in a
communication which also includes legal advice. 17 1
The interesting thing about Judge Wyzanski's decision-quite apart from
whether one agrees with his estimate of patent work 72-is the characterization
technique he employed. Apparently the significant fact for him was not the
percentage of "legal" or "business" content in the particular communication;
rather, the characterization stemmed from the overall purpose, measured in
terms of relative time expended, of the attorney's labors for the particular
client. In other words, occasional lapses into the role of business adviser
would not result in a loss of the privilege 73 any more than occasional exer-
cises of legal advice would invoke it. It is the general impression, not the
particular instance, that governs-a kind of juridical "pointillism."
Something of the same tendency to deal with general classifications rather
than with individual communications has been evinced by other courts. In
one New York case where the attorney was also a director the opinion
states-rather too broadly-that "acceptance [of the directorship] necessarily
removed him from the relation of attorney or counsel to its officers, so far as
the corporate affairs were concerned. . . . " This early New York decision
was cited with approval by District Judge Knox, who likewise evinced blanket
disapproval of the privilege where an attorney who commenced his relationship
with the client as an accountant and continued in that capacity after he was
admitted to the bar.75
On the other hand, some courts have concentrated on characterizing the
particular communications, in situations where attorneys were cast in a dual
71. 89 F. Supp. at 359. (Emphasis added.)
72. Accord, Kent jewelry Corp. v. Kiefer, 202 Misc. 778, 113 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup.
Ct. 1952). But cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954), quoted
in note 70 supra. See Notes, 23 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 786 (1955), 51 MicH. L. Ray. 601
(1953).
73. 'See 8 WiGmOR § 2296, at 569:
"Where the general purpose concerns legal rights and obligations, a particular
incidental transaction would receive protection, though in itself it were merely
commercial in nature-as where the financial condition of a shareholder is dis-
cussed, in the course of a proceeding to enforce a claim against a corporation."
74. In the Matter of Robinson, 140 App. Div. 329, 336, 125 N.Y. Supp. 193, 199
(1st Dep't 1910) (lawyer guilty of professional misconduct when he insisted upon the
privilege before a federal grand jury questioning him about corporate acts). But cf.
Stone v. Grayson Shops, 8 F.R.D. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (attorney for defendant corpora-
tion was also its director and secretary; privilege upheld as to some questions, denied
as to others without deciding capacity in which latter information was received because
it came from "third persons," citing Hickman v. Taylor; but opinion does not state who
those "third persons" were).
75. In re Fisher, 51 F.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
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role.70 In particular, Judge Leahy's recent decision in the RCA case 77
contrasts strongly with the technique employed in United Shoe. Confronted
with some 1,600 documents, many of them involving the corporation's patent
department, Judge Leahy refused to condemn them all but instead consented
to appoint a special master to determine "the special relationship that must be
found for each document separately considered." 78 The question, he said, was
one of fact, and with documents written "under varying circumstances and
times, one blanket ruling on their production would unnecessarily risk inac-
curacies of generalization." 79  Accordingly, general but somewhat elastic
ground rules were laid down in the court's opinion to serve as instructions to
the special master, and illustrative rulings were provided in an appendix to
the opinion.8 0
The differing approaches of Judges Wyzanski and Leahy might well be
combined by considering the problem in terms of the order of proof. Although
the person resisting disclosure is usually said to have the burden of proof,
ordinarily he need come forward only with a modicum of evidence as to the
fact of the attorney-client relationship and the nature of the disclosure.8 '
Given such evidence, it is the normal inference that the disclosure was made
confidentially by the client to his attorney acting as such. Likewise, where the
communication is by the attorney to his client, the normal inference is that
the attorney is rendering legal advice upon request, so that disclosure of the
attorney's advice would probably give away the client's prior disclosures.8
2
These inferences should hold despite a showing that an attorney who ordinarily
76. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 61 and 64 supra.
77. Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954).
78. Id. at 794.
79. Id. at 793.
80. Id. at 796.
81. SeeS X8VixoR § 2296, at 569:
"[Tihe most that can be said, by way of generalization, is that a matter committed
to a professional legal adviser is 'prima facie' so committed for the sake of the legal
advice which may be more or less desirable for some aspect of the matter, and is
therefore within the privilege, unless it clearly appears to be lacking in aspects
requiring legal advice."
Compare 3 JONES, EvmENCE § 749, at 1348-49 (4th ed. 1938)
"[I]f the proffered statement relates to a matter which is so connected with the
employment as attorney as to create a presumption that it was drawn out by the
relation of attorney and client, the conclusion must be that it is privileged from
disclosure."
See Bacon v. Frisbie, S0 N.Y. 394, 399 (1880):
"And whenever the communication made, relates to a matter so connected with
the employment as attorney or counsel as to afford presumption that it was the
ground of the address by the client, then it is privileged from disclosure. .. ."
82. Cf. 8 WIGATORE § 2320; Shawmut, Inc. v. American Viscose Corp., 12 F.R.D.
488 (D. Mass. 1952); In re Prudence-Bonds Corp., 76 F. Supp. 643 (E.D.N.Y. 1948) ;
Minter v. Priest [1929] 1 K.B. 655, criticized in 43 HARv. L. REv. 134 (1929). But cf.
Magida v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74, 77-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (communication
from attorney unprivileged, but seemingly treated as "work product").
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acts in a legal capacity had on occasion received or given collateral business
advice as an incident of his legal assistance, for, as judge Wyzanski so
aptly observed, this would be true in almost every case. Accordingly, where
proof was lacking that the attorney had been acting in a distinct business
capacity, the inference would continue and the person seeking disclosure
would have the burden of satisfying the court that a particular communication
was a business one and could be effectively segregated from the others.
On the other hand, the burden of going forward with evidence would be
shifted once it was shown that the attorney had not only been active in the
usual kind of legal assistance, but had also been regularly acting as a business
adviser in an area that included the transaction in issue. Since the client in
such a case has placed the attorney in a dual role where his true colors are
hard to perceive, it should be up to the client (or the person urging his privi-
lege) to satisfy the court that a particular communication qualifies for protection
and can be effectively segregated from the others.
If this analysis is sound, it would be unwise but not necessarily fatal, insofar
as the privilege is concerned, for an attorney to accept any recognized business
position with his client-as director, officer, department head, or the like. Such
an attorney would have to be prepared to segregate his legal activities in a
clearly demonstrable fashion. The same would be true of an attorney who
systematically participated in business affairs without assuming any definite
business title. A corporation should certainly not be encouraged to select its
business advisers from the ranks of the legal profession with a view to the
special privilege of secrecy granted attorneys.
Corporate Records
Another "dual role" problem presented is this: how can the client's written
communications to his attorney be protected without furnishing a privileged
sanctuary for the client's business records? The problem is not unique to
corporations, but the volume and variety of their business records, and the
ubiquity of their lawyers, accentuate the difficulties. If the lawyer participates
in the preparation of the record, then the lawyer's role and the nature of the
record become overlapping questions.
The classic distinction is between "pre-existing"' papers and "communicating"
papers.83 Thus, it is perfectly clear that a paper of the client prepared prior
to and not for the purpose of legal consultation rises to no higher dignity
when subsequently transferred to the attorney.84 By hypothesis such "pre-
existing papers" do not contain confidences stimulated by the lawyer, and
should be no more privileged in the attorney's hands than they were when
83. 8 WIGMORE § 2307, at 594.
84. Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 79 (1913); Wise v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 37 Del. 209, 178 Atl. 640 (Super. Ct. 1935); Jones v. Reilly, 174 N.Y. 97, 66 N.E.
649 (1902) ; In re Keough, 151 Ohio St. 307, 314, 85 N.E.2d 550, 554 (1949) ; ef. Falsone
v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953); Monticello Tobacco Co. v. American
Tobacco Co., 12 F.R.D. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). But see Blankenship v. Rowntree, 219
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in his client's possession.8 5 Similarly, information gleaned by the attorney
directly from a study of the "pre-existing paper" would seem to be unprivi-
leged s," (although in the federal courts it might now qualify for limited pro-
tection as "work product") .7 While the doctrine of the "pre-existing paper"
could conceivably result in a reluctance to gather together existing data and
files in a single assemblage for use by the attorney, the social interest in
F.2d 597, 599-600 (10th Cir. 1955) ; Liggett v. Glenn, 51 Fed. 381, 395-96 (8th Cir. 1892).
See, generally, 8 WIGIORE § 2307. But Cf. 3 JONE S, EVIDmCE § 750a (4th ed. 1938).
The same distinction would seem to apply to a photograph handed to counsel by the
client. Cf. Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267 P.2d 1025 (1954) (privileged
treatment accorded both accident reports and photographs) ; State ex rel. Terminal R.
Ass'n v. Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 257 S.W.2d 69 (1953) (photographs taken by railroad's
"special service departments" treated as privileged) ; Bloodgood v. Lynch, 293 N.Y. 308, 314
56 N.E.2d 718, 720-21 (1944) (photograph of car may be privileged). Perhaps this means
that there can be no privilege unless the client took the picture. Cf. Shields v. Sobelman,
64 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (photograph of winch taken under lawyer's supervision
treated like the winch itself and therefore not privileged).
85. As custodian for the client, the attorney may claim on the client's behalf any
privilege that the client himself might have claimed had the papers remained with the
client. E.g., Petition of Snow, 75 N.H. 7, 70 Atl. 120 (1908) (privilege against self-
incrimination); Selden v. State, 74 Wis. 271, 42 N.W. 218 (1889) (privileged marital
communication). In this respect the attorney may be the same as any other custodial
agent. Cf. In the Matter of Ryan, 281 App. Div. 953, 120 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1st Dep't
1953) (client's privilege against self-incrimination asserted successfully by accountant
entrusted with client's personal papers), rev'd on other grounds, 306 N.Y. 11, 114
N.E2d 183 (1953).
86. Wigmore urges that the "communication of the [contents of the pre-existing]
document is distinct from the document itself"; therefore the attorney may only be
compelled to produce the pre-existing documents, and not to testify concerning the client's
communication of their contents. 8 WieGxoRE § 2308, at 596. See 1 MORGAN, BASIC PROB-
LEMS OF EVIDENCE 102 (1954). Yet suppose such a document were accidentally lost or
destroyed? It is difficult to see how repetition by the client of pre-existing unprivileged
records (available to others on subpoena) could have been in confidence and prompted
by the relationship with the attorney unless something was added by the client which was
not in the records. In contrast, where the client is communicating the contents of his own
mind it is a fair inference that the substance of the disclosure was influenced by the
relationship.
87. Cf. Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971, 978 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 963 (1950). As to the status of a "collection of records," see Lyell v. Kennedy,
9 App. Cas. 81, 87, 93 (1883). It should be noted that the admissibility of pre-existing
records, business reports and communications to lawyers acting in some other capacity
have been carried over into the "work product" cases. E.g., United States v. Chin Lim
Mow, 12 F.R.D. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1952); Bifferato v. States Marine Corp., 11 F.R.D. 44,
46 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Reiss v. British Gen. Ins. Co., 9 F.R.D. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1949);
Newell v. Capital Transit Co., 7 F.R.D. 732 (D.D.C. 1948). See also the Ohio accident
report cases cited in note 24 supra. See, generally, 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 26.23 [8]
(2d ed. 1950). Unlike the privilege, the "work product" doctrine would extend to any
records processed by the attorney, no matter from whom obtained. Yet a letter from
client to attorney might not involve such processing. Thus the "work product" doctrine
does not include the privilege but only overlaps it on one edge; moreover, unlike the
privilege (to date), its protection is conditional and terminates with the particular
litigation for which the record was processed.
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furthering legal assistance does not require absolute protection for the assem-
blage. One can easily imagine the improper use to which such a privileged
sanctuary could be put, and this no doubt explains the refusal to carry the
privilege so far.
It follows that business correspondence, accountants' books, inter-office re-
ports, file memoranda, minutes of business meetings, and all the other mountains
of papers accumulated by modem enterprises would ordinarily not qualify for
the privilege even though they were subsequently transmitted to counsel.
Perhaps the act or circumstances of transmission would be privileged if signifi-
cant in themselves, and no doubt the request for advice itself, since it reveals
something more than is in the papers, would also qualify.8 8 But the contents
of the pre-existing records would remain unprivileged.
Suppose, however, that the records are prepared by or at the instance of
counsel. Some of the state accident report cases suggest that the employee's
report is privileged only if submitted to counsel for use in pending or antici-
pated litigation.8 9 Yet such a test seems wrong on two counts. On the one
hand, it would apparently extend the privilege to accident reports that are
rendered to counsel as a matter of routine, litigation being viewed as just
-around the corner in every instance: it does not provide a touchstone for
segregating the unprivileged portion that is mixed into such reports. On
the other hand, the imminence of litigation is a useful negative test only where
there is no other reason for legal advice. It may well be that accident reports
need not be prepared for counsel unless litigation is in the wind, but this is not
true of other kinds of factual reports prepared by or submitted to counsel,
particularly since litigation is usually the least portion of the corporate lawyer's
work.
Again, the problem should be handled in terms of the order of the proof.
Once the person seeking disclosure demonstrated that the particular record
88. Quaere whether the privilege would extend to the minutes of a directors' meeting
discussing the need for calling upon counsel. Cf. Mayor & Corp. of Bristol v. Cox, 26 Ch.
D. 678, 682, 685 (1884) (privilege extends to minutes of corporate committees discussing
litigation and to a printed report on this subject circulated between the committees and the
corporation).
89. See cases cited in note 27 sitpra. After an early struggle in England, it has
long been settled that the privilege applies to any legal consultation, whether or not for
the purpose of litigation. 8 WiGmoRm §§ 2294, 2295. See It re Williams' Estate, 179 Misc.
805, 39 N.Y.S.2d 741, 744 (Surr. 1942); People v. Warden of County Jail, 150 Misc. 714,
717, 270 N.Y. Supp. 362, 366 (Sup. Ct. 1934). The federal notion of attorney's "work
,product," on the other hand, is limited to preparation for suit because it is grounded in
the code duello of adversary litigation. To the extent that the state accident report cases
tend to make the imminence of litigation an absolute prerequisite, they are crossing over
into the area of "work product."
90. Cf. Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 512, 267 P2d 1025, 1031-32 (1954)
(even routine accident reports privileged if "dominant purpose" was to use them in litiga-
tion; concurring/dissenting opinion says test should be whether the report would not
have been prepared but for this use; neither opinion considers possibility of requiring
segregation of privileged and unprivileged information). Compare note 92 infra.
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was one that the company would ordinarily maintain for itself without regard
to counsel, it would be prima facie the equivalent of a "pre-existing" record;
it would then be unprivileged unless its disclosures were affirmatively shown
to have been prompted by the need for legal advice. The imminence of liti-
gation would be merely one way-and not necessarily a conclusive one--of
demonstrating the significance of the lawyer's intervention. 91 As before, if the
record mixed together business and privileged material, it would fall upon the
corporation, which is the party responsible for the confusion, to segregate the
privileged portion from the unprivileged.
By thus returning to first principles, by insisting on satisfactory proof
that the corporation's special frankness in its records was the result of its
need for counsel, the courts could avoid too broad a rule, but without narrow-
ing unduly the circle of corporate spokesmen or limiting the functions of coun-
sel to the area of preparation for litigation.92 In practice, the approach sug-
gested would mean that form reports, routine questionnaires and the like would
almost never be privileged, but detailed interviews conducted by an attorney
and recorded by him would frequently qualify. Companies producing large
masses of paper work would get less benefit from the privilege than those
which ordinarily have skimpier records, but any privilege necessarily favors
the close-mouthed.
MULTIPLE PARTICIPATION OF CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVES
Not all communications between client and attorney are protected. They
must be made "in confidence," else the privilege never attaches, and they
must be kept "in confidence," else the privilege is lost.93 The rule is a fairly
91. I submit that the recommended application of the "pre-existing record" doctrine
would dispose of situations where the company sought to label every accident report, no
matter from whom taken or by whom obtained, as being destined for the confidential use
of counsel. See, e.g., Dugger v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 5 F.R.D. 334 (E.D.N.Y. 1.946)
(general counsel issued instruction letter that all accident reports were to be for his
confidential use in possible litigation). In Hickman v. Taylor the amicus curiae brief
of the United Railroad Workers of America, at p. 5, pointed to the Dugger case as a
dreadful example of what would happen unless all statements by employees were held
unprivileged. See note 36 supra.
92. The lower court in Hickman v. Taylor stressed the fact that "there were com-
pelling reasons for taking the statements of the survivors, entirely unconnected with any
anticipated suits for damages . . . [such as] general safety considerations and a due
regard for their obligations to the public, as well as their own interest, in view of
the possibility of unfounded or unfair criticism." 4 F.R.D. at 482. See also note 66 supra.
Yet in that case the company had no regular investigators of its own, these same
employees had already testified at a public steamboat inspector's hearing, and the
attorney himself had been expressly retained to defend in the "anticipated litigation."
Ibid. Moreover, it seems anomalous to characterize an attorney's factual interviews as
business records simply because his findings are so reliable that the company might well,
as a secondary benefit, rely on them in its business. In the common experience of the
practicing attorney, his probing of the employee usually is a good deal more thorough
than the standard accident report or even the conclusions of an investigation board.
93. 8 WIGMORE § 2311.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
easy one to observe when the attorney is dealing with an individual client. The
interviews are held behind closed doors with no one else present, except
perhaps for a stenographer or law clerk: the client is then cautioned not to re-
peat his disclosures elsewhere, and not to send copies of his written communi-
cations to anyone else. These simple measures are usually efficacious. 4
With a corporate client, the problem is more difficult. Corporate actions, be
they letters, reports, decisions or consultations, are typically products of
staffs and groups of persons, rather than of any single individual. Papers in-
tended for counsel usually circulate within the corporation-acquiring the
stamps or comments of the various offices through which they pass-both
before and after they have reached counsel, and file copies of such papers may
be stored in the corporation's own open records as a matter of course. As a
result, a large number of persons have knowledge of a disclosure and are in
a position to repeat it to the outside world.
The interrelated privilege problems thus presented will be considered in the
following order: (1) confidentiality within the organization, (2) waiver by a
corporate agent, and (3) litigation between agent and corporation.
Confidentiality Within the Organization
In the case of an individual client, the traditional rule is that only persons
necessary to the communication may be present at his confidential conference
with counsel; anyone else is a "third party" whose presence spoils the privi-
lege.95 The rigidity with which the rule has been followed justifies a suspi-
cion that it rests not only on an implied waiver or consent, but also on a policy
against permitting the privilege to silence too many people. 6 Thus there is
94. See, generally, cases collected in Annot., 53 A.L.R. 369 (1928); 8 WIGMOR §
2301; 58 Ami. Jm, Witnesses §§ 492-94, 518 (1948). Cf. Solon v. Lichtenstein, 39 Cal.
2d 75, 79-80, 244 P.2d 907, 910 (1952) (client's prior repetition of statement to others
shows it was not regarded as confidential when told to his attorney); Drew v. Drew,
250 Mass. 41, 144 N.E. 763 (1924) (client showed letter to others).
95. See 1 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EvwnFcE 102-03 (1954):
"The requirement of confidence . . . implies . . . that the means of transmission
shall not, to the knowledge of the client, disclose the information to any person
other than one reasonably necessary to accomplish the transmission, and that it
be disclosed to no one not necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for
which it was transmitted."
See also 8 WIGIORE § 2311, at 602:
"Here, even if we might predicate a desire for confidence by the client, the policy
of the privilege would still not protect him, because it goes no further than is
necessary . . . and the presence of a third person (other than the agent of either)
is obviously unnecessary for communications to the attorney as such ..
See also note 34 supra.
96. Compare Bowers v. State, 29 Ohio St. 542, 546 (1876) (mother of youthful
prosecutrix in bastardy proceeding was present to inspire frankness from her daughter
and thus acted as a confidential agent; held: privileged), with Gordon v. Robinson, 109
F. Supp. 106 (W.D. Penn. 1952) (client's stepson present during conference in hospital;
held: unprivileged). See also Parnacher v. Mount, 248 P.2d 1021 (Okla. 1952) ; Wright
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even authority holding that an eavesdropper, or a purloiner of the client's
letter to counsel, is not bound by the privilege; in that situation, however, the
privilege remains in force as betveen client and attorney, because the disclosure
to the "third party" was not a voluntary one. 97
In the case of a corporation, it is possible that the communication-at least
while it is en route to counsel-need be kept confidential only as between the
corporate entity and the outside world.98 In United Shoe Judge Wyzanski
suggested this,99 and in the RCA case Judge Leahy seemed to follow his
view.10 0 Their opinions also indicate, or assume, that any corporate employee
who is not a "third party" for the purpose of qualification as spokesman is,
v. Quinn, 201 Okla. 565, 207 P.2d 912 (1949) ; Ratzloff v. State, 122 Okla. 262, 249 Pac.
934 (1926). See DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 135 (1953): "[The rule against disclosure]
would apply if the third party was present in such capacity as to be identified with the
client; for example, where the mother [n.48] or a friend [n.49] of the client accompanied
the client to the lawyer, seeking his advice." Drinker's note 4S cites Bowers v. State,
supra; his note 49 cites Op. No. 420 of the Bar Ass'n of the City of N.Y., which indicates
that the legal privilege is inapplicable but refers to cases stressing the attorney's duty of
loyalty.
97. 8 WIGmoRE §§ 2325(3), 2326. See note 34 supra.
98. Compare cases holding that dictation by a corporate officer to his stenographer is
not a corporate communication to a "third person" within the meaning of the slander
law, because of the corporate entity notion. E.g., Mims v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
200 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 940 (1953).
99. "[Protection may be afforded for] information which was secured from an officer
or employee of defendant and which was not disclosed in a public document." 89 F. Supp.
at 361. (Emphasis added.) The opinion also refers to the privilege being lost by the
presence of "strangers" or "third persons" or "outsiders." Id. at 358, 359, 360, 361.
There is no definition of these terms, except that a patent or a judicial opinion are given
as illustrations of a "public document." Id. at 359. See Edison Elec. Light Co. v. United
States Elec. Lighting Co., 44 Fed. 294, 298 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890) (a patent case cited
by Judge Wyzanskl):
"[I]f the document thus confidentially prepared [as a result of the consultation
with counsel] is not so kept, if the contract is by the client executed with some
third person, or the notice is given or the letter sent to some outsider, its contents
are no longer confined to the knowledge of client and counsel, and the party can
no longer, as to a document which he has thus made public, claim that it is privi-
leged because it is confidential." (Emphasis added.)
100. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Del. 1954):
"[There is a privilege only if] the communication relates to a fact of which the
attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers ...
In this case, the corporation is the client. 'Strangers' are those not affiliated with
the corporation as employees, officers, directors, or 'outside counsel'."
Accord, Connecticut Mlut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
(member of bridge commission obtained information at conference in which other mem-
bers, commission's counsel and joint clients participated; privilege upheld, without dis-
cussion). But see Livezey v. United States, 279 Fed. 496, 499 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
260 U.S. 721 (1922) (disclosure to corporate counsel by president in presence of two
other officers held unprivileged on the ground, inter alia, that "third parties were
present"; however, the president's disclosure involved his embezzlement of corporate
funds and may have been made in a personal rather than a corporate capacity).
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as a matter of logic, not a "third party" or "outsider" for the purpose of con-
fidentiality. Similarly, the state accident report cases have not evinced any
objection to the report passing upward through organizational channels before
crossing into the hands of counsel. 10 '
A related question is whether copies of documents intended for counsel may
be retained in the corporation's open files. In one recent case a corporation
inadvertently permitted the government to copy certain letters to counsel
which were in its open files; a federal district court held that the privilege
had been waived, observing:
"It is difficult to be persuaded that these documents were intended to
remain confidential in the light of the fact that they were indiscriminately
mingled with the other routine documents of the corporation and that
no special effort to preserve them in segregated files with special protec-
tions was made. One measure of their continuing confidentiality is the
degree of care exhibited in their keeping, and the risk of insufficient pre-
cautions must rest with the party claiming the privilege."'
10 2
Similarly, a number of the state accident report cases contain dicta that the
report, to qualify for the privilege, must ultimately be turned over to counsel
(or to the legal department) and remain continuously in their possession
thereafter.103
Yet it is an accepted principle that the privilege protects both client and
attorney from forced disclosure of the client's confidences ;104 accordingly, the
privilege should apply with equal force to the client's own copies of letters to
his attorney.10 5 The only valid objection to letting the client keep a copy for
himself would be the possibility that it might be shown to "third parties."
Thus the filing question, as applied to corporations, seems to reduce itself
to this: are there persons within the organization who should be prevented
101. See cases cited in note 27 supra.
102. United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (D. Mich. 1954).
Note also the remark that the documents were not "work product" because they "were
apparently circulated among the interested officials of Budd and it does not appear that
they resided in the patent counsel's work files when pulled by the Government's repre-
sentatives." Id. at 465.
It does not appear how the nearly 800 exhibits involved in United Shoe were stored,
but in a companion case "thousands of strictly intra-corporate documents"-perhaps in-
cluding the 800--were described as having been kept "in its [the corporation's] own files"
without being "disclosed to third persons." 89 F. Supp. at 351 (1950). Cf. Mayor &
Corp. of Bristol v. Cox, 26 Ch. D. 678, 682, 685 (1884) (privileged treatment for report
on litigation circulated within the corporation).
103. See In re Keough, 151 Ohio St. 307, 85 N.E2d 550 (1949) (syllabus) ; Davies
v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Co., 68 N.E2d 571, 579 (Ohio C.P. 1938); Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry. v. Burks, 78 Kan. 515, 526, 96 Pac. 950, 953 (1908).
104. 8 WiG3_Ioim § 2324.
105. But cf. People v. Rittenhouse, 56 Cal. App. 541, 206 Pac. 86 (1922) (document
found in cell by sheriff after prisoner had been removed; court refuses privilege to docu-




from seeing or hearing confidential communications to counsel, or is privacy
from the "outside" world sufficient?
The problem here is not to decide who is qualified as corporate spokesman
but rather to fix the number of persons who should be allowed privileged
knowledge of disclosures obtained from one or more of them. It does not
necessarily follow that counsel should always be permitted to interview
all the directors in a privileged group merely because he may speak to them
seriatim, nor that counsel may report a privileged communication to any
officer he chooses. To take a more extreme example, I very much doubt that
United Shoe would have permitted the privilege if a mass meeting of the
patent department and all inventor-employees had been called to listen in on
a disclosure to counsel. Equally, I assume that United Shoe would not deny
the privilege merely because one or two nonsource agents-file clerks for
example- had subsequently read the report.
I suggest that the decisive factor for a court should be the impracticality of
drawing a line for privacy narrower than that followed within the organization
itself as a matter of routine. The corporation's own internal security practices,
whatever they might be, should ordinarily be indicative of its desire for
secrecy, and suspicions that information is being circulated unnecessarily with-
in the organization should not be lightly entertained.
It is conceivable, of course, that cases may arise where persons within
the organization are seeking to use the privilege as a guise for communicating
with each other on business matters, either orally or in writing. Here again, in
substance, the problem is to distinguish between a conference with counsel
and a business consultation at which counsel was present. It should be handled,
again, in terms of the order of proof: if it is shown that the number of
persons participating in the conference or in the preparation or actual use
of the document is such that there appears to have been a business consulta-
tion, then it should fall upon the corporation to come forward with proof of
its legal and confidential nature.
Meanwhile, until the question has been further clarified by the courts, the
safest procedure is for counsel to insist, insofar as practical, that conferences
be limited in number, that papers be circulated only among persons essential
to the disclosure, and that documents addressed to counsel be placed in a
confidential file.
Waiver by a Corporate Agent
In general, the capacity to waive the corporation's privilege by disclosure
to an "outsider" should go hand-in-hand with the authority to seek legal
advice on behalf of the corporation; and it should go no further. For instance,
a source agent or a communicating agent who confers with the attorney at the
corporation's behest is not necessarily the one who makes the decision on
behalf of the corporation to seek legal advice. Equally, such an agent might
not have the authority to waive the privilege on behalf of the corporation, even
though he was himself the source of the corporate disclosure being protected.
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(Of course, he could still be required to testify as to his own knowledge.) On
the other hand, a managing agent with express or implied authority to select
legal advisers and to seek legal advice would also have the authority to decide
for the corporation whether information disclosed should be kept confidential
or not.
If this analysis is correct, a disclosure to anyone outside the ambit of cor-
porate confidence, by an officer or other supervisory agent of sufficient status,
should be construed as a waiver of privilege by the corporation. 0 0 Perhaps it
would be possible to make sure that subordinates or other persons of middle
stature within the organization would not be considered as having authority to
waive, by labeling a particular record "Not to be Circulated Outside the Com-
pany Without the Approval of " or by other appropriate directions
in advance. If a higher ranking officer violated such instructions, of course,
he might well be held to have had implied authority to issue new instructions
himself. But even agents of the highest authority might be explicitly deprived
of their status altogether, or of authority to waive, between the time of their
original disclosure to counsel and the time when they allegedly waive.
In this connection the corporate attorney who also has business responsibili-
ties in the organization should exercise special care, for although it is usually
said that a subsequent disclosure by the attorney will not constitute a waiver
unless the client's consent can be shown or implied, 10 7 a disclosure by an
attorney who was also a managing agent of the corporation would probably
constitute a waiver by the corporation. 0 8
For the same reasons, it would be well for "house counsel" to keep in mind
that, unlike "outside counsel," he may have implied authority as a matter of
course to disclose information on the corporation's behalf and, therefore, to
waive its privilege. Equally, an attorney who has express authority to ne-
gotiate or deal with a third party probably has implied authority to disclose
any information obtained from the client in regard to that transaction ;100
for he is acting as a business agent as well as a legal adviser."'
Litigation between Agent and Corporation
It is a settled rule that the privilege does not apply, inter sese, when two or
more persons, having shared a single attorney on a matter of common interest,
106. Cf. Stewart Equipment Co. v. Gallo, 32 N.J. Super. 15, 107 A.2d 527 (L. 1954),
where defendant urged that witness, a vice-president and sales manager of the corporation,
had waived by his prior testimony. The court held that there could be no waiver without
a showing of authority to waive, but implied that the result would have been different
if the witness had been a director. Should not the test here have been whether witness
had authority to give the prior testimony?
107. 8 WIGMORE § 2325. See Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 939 (9th
Cir. 1949) (implied consent).
108. Cf. United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751 (D. Del. 1943)
(attorney who was also a director produced documents for Justice Dep't; corporation
could not later claim privilege for the documents).
109. See, e.g., Rediker v. Warfield, 11 F.R.D. 125, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
110. Compare the cases cited in notes 61-64 supra.
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subsequently have a falling out with respect to the subject matter of the con-
sultation."' The inter sese rule, as I shall term it, should be distinguished
from waiver by one of the joint clients, which results in a loss of the privilege
in suits brought by outsiders, as well as between the parties. Also, a joint
client may waive only for his own statements, but the inter sese rule applies to
joint statements and to those made by the other client." 2
The inter sese rule is usually explained on the ground that the client could
not have intended secrecy with respect to the persons in whom he confides." 8
Another explanation would be that the exception is necessary if the shared
transaction is to be fairly stated in subsequent litigation between the parties." 4
111. See cases in Annot., 141 A.L.R. 553 (1942); 8 WIGMORE § 2312. The ALI's
Model Code states the "well settled law" as follows:
"When two or more persons acting together become clients of the same lawyer as
to a matter of common interest, none of them has as against another of them any
privilege . . . with respect to that matter."
'MODEL, CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 211 (1942).
If the client anticipated at the outset a conflict between himself and the persons to
whom he permitted disclosure, there should probably be no privilege at all, even as against
outside parties. Compare Root v. Wright, 84 N.Y. 72 (1881) (adverse parties unite in
seeking advice from common attorney; privileged as to outsiders), with Harris v.
Daugherty, 74 Tex. 1, 11 S.W. 921 (1889) (attorney was acting for one party only; no
privilege).
112. Wigmore states that waiver should be joint for joint statements, that neither can
waive for the disclosure of the other's statements, and that neither can obstruct the other
in the disclosure of his own statements. 8 WIGMORE § 2328. As to waiver, compare
People v. Patrick, 182 N.Y. 131, 175, 74 N.E. 843, 857 (1905) (accomplice who had joint
counsel with defendant permitted to testify that he told his counsel of his own guilt)
aith State v. Archuleta, 29 N.M. 25, 31, 217 Pac. 619, 621 (1923) (inter sese rule
distinguished here on ground that defendant who turned state's witness was not the party-
plaintiff, hence his statements to joint defense counsel could not be disclosed by the
defense without the witness' own waiver).
Morgan observes that the inter sese rule applies whether or not the joint clients were
all present at the time of the communication, because "A communication by one relative
to the common subject matter, to be kept secret from the others, would savor of fraud."
1 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 104 (1954). But cf. cases in 70 C.J., Witnesses
§ 551, at 411 n.60 (1935). However, the court's task is easier where all parties were
present, since the statements of the other party are then admissible either because there
was a joint consultation or because a "third party" was present and no privilege attached.
E.g., La Barge v. La Barge, 284 App. Div. 996, 135 N.Y.S.2d 317 (3d Dep't 1954); cf.
Cafritz v. Koslow, 167 F.2d 749, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
113. See 8 WIGMORE § 2312, at 603: "[The communications] are not privileged . . .
between the two original parties, inasmuch as the common interest and employment for-
bade concealment by either from the other." Compare Annot., 141 A.L.R. 553, 554-55
(1942) : "[Joint client's] communications to [the common attorney] in the presence of each
other, or his statements to them, are obviously not intended to be confidential as between
themselves, and accordingly are not privileged as between the conferees ... "
114. See, e.g., Horowitz v. Le Lacheure, 101 A.2d 483, 487 (R.I. 1953) : "So long
as such a disclosure is directed . . . to the promotion of justice in a controversy between
two clients arising out of a common or joint undertaking in which the attorney acted
for both, the privilege against disclosure is removed." Viewed in this way, the inter sese
rule would not apply if the subject matter of the litigation was unrelated to the consultation.
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Viewed in this way, the joint client cases are not dissimilar from those which
permit an attorney to disclose his client's confidences to the extent necessary
to recover his fee or to defend himself from accusations by the client.,
Joint client situations may be expected to occur with some frequency in
corporate consultations. Indeed, a single person may be speaking for two
clients. For example, a director discusses with corporate counsel a corporate
business opportunity of which he had availed himself personally. Subsequently,
a stockholder commences a derivative action against the director and demands
a copy of the interview. If the director was alone with counsel, then it may
be he was seeking personal advice, on the understanding that his communica-
tions would not be revealed to the corporation. In that event, the privilege is
his alone.' However, if another director were present, or if the consulting
director indicated that his information was to be shared with the corporation,
then the consultation would appear to be either on behalf of the corporation
alone, or on behalf of the two clients jointly; in either event, the director
could not prevent production of the interview in the suit brought for the
corporation. But if the plaintiff were someone other than the corporation-in
a criminal case, for example-the inter sese rule would have no application;
instead, the state would have to show either that the conversation was unprivi-
leged at the outset"10 or else that the privilege belonged solely to the corporation,
which could waive it by allowing the attorney to testify.117
Apart from joint consultations, difficult questions may arise concerning
the extent, if any, to which the inter sese rule should apply in subsequent
controversies between the corporation and its agents. I suggest that an
agent who on behalf of the corporation has spoken to its attorney-like the
attorney himself-should be permitted to reveal confidential communications
115. E.g., Browning v. Potter, 129 Colo. 448, 271 P2d 418 (1954); Moore v. State,
231 Ind. 690, 111 N.E.2d 47 (1953) (prisoner claims counsel was inadequate) ; Leverich
v. Leverich, 340 Mich. 133, 64 N.W.2d 567 (1954) ; Shelton v. Gwathmey, 201 Misc. 75,
107 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (suit for attorney's fee). See, generally, 58 Am. Jun.,
Witnesses § 514 (1948). Of course this exception should not operate to permit the attorney
to clear his reputation where the charges against him are made by some one other than his
client. But see United States v. Weinberg, 129 F. Supp. 514, 522 (D. Pa. 1955) (govern-
ment's criminal charges).
116. Livezey v. United States, 279 Fed. 496, 499 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S.
721 (1922) (semble). Compare Becher v. United States, 5 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1924), cert.
denied, 267 U.S. 602 (1925), where a principal and his attorney interviewed a hostile
agent whom they suspected of having misused the principal's money. The court ruled that
the interview was "in no sense" privileged, because it was "between the client on the one
hand and a third person on the other, as an opposed party." See note 13 slepra.
1.17. E.g., State v. Ross, 312 Mo. 510, 279 S.W. 411 (1926) ; cf. Schneider v. Leigh,
[1955] 2 Q.B. 195 (C.A.) (accident victim sues for libel by company doctor who examined
him; doctor's report delivered to plaintiff by company solicitor, thus waiving the privilege,
which belonged solely to the company). Cf. Leyner v. Leyner, 123 Iowa 185, 98 N.W. 628
(1904) (client may waive his privilege for statements to attorney made by his wife as his
agent) ; Bingham v. Walk, 128 Ind. 164, 27 N.E. 483 (1891) (same).
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when necessary, inter sese, to justify his fee or defend his conduct." Beyond
that, disclosure should not be permitted merely because the client once reposed
a confidence in his agent, unless the subject matter of the controversy is so
interwoven with the agency that there is no other way in which the transaction
can be fairly stated 'between the parties.
CONCLUSION
To test and summarize the principles outlined in this paper, and to point up
the differences between the corporate and the individual privilege, assume the
somewhat complicated but perhaps not infrequent case of a joint conference
with corporate counsel, involving both the corporation, acting through agents,
and another person seeking legal advice for himself (such as, say, a stock-
holder). Both conferences might take place together without loss of the
privilege if there were a mutual problem and mutual trust, but their differing
aspects must be kept in mind. The corporation's agent would have to qualify
as spokesman for the corporate client before the privilege could exist at all for
the corporation; naturally no such qualification would be necessary in regard
to disclosures made on the agent's own behalf. Because they could be merely
disguised business records, corporate papers prepared for counsel would be
subjected to a jealous scrutiny which personal papers would probably escape.
The corporation's disclosures could probably circulate in confidence within
its own organization; the individual could not consent to any disclosure to others
except as a necessary incident of the joint consultation. The corporation's
agent would not himself have to be contemplating legal advice for it unless
he was of such stature as to act for the corporation in this respect; the indi-
vidual would have to be seeking it. The corporation's agent could not waive
the privilege for it unless authori-ed to do so; the individual could waive for
himself. The corporation and individual could each waive for their own dis-
closures to counsel, but neither could waive for those made by, or made jointly
with, the other. Between the corporation on the one hand, and the individual
118. The authority to date is to the contrary, but may be distinguishable on the
facts. Blankenship v. Rowntree, 219 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1955) (disclosure by individual's
communicating agent not permitted in agent's suit for services; however, the agent sought
to use the communication to prove collateral matters as well as those related to his
agency) ; In re Busse's Estate, 332 Ill. App. 258, 75 N.E.2d 36 (1947) (client's business
manager not permitted to introduce client's admissions of indebtedness made in presence
of manager and attorney for purpose of obtaining legal advice), criticized, 15 U. CI.
L. REv. 939, 61 HARv. L. REi% 717 (1948) ; Foley v. Poschke, 137 Ohio St. 593, 31 N.E.2d
845 (1941) (private detective present at client's conference with attorney when client
apparently communicated her matrimonial difficulties; disclosure not permitted in agent's
suit for services, but it does not appear whether the disclosure was necessary).
If directors A and B are both present and speak for the benefit of the corporation at
a conference with corporate counsel, should A be permitted to show what he himself said
in order to prove the value of his services? Should A be permitted to show what B said?
Should the result be any different if B were speaking to A as well as to the attorney?
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on the other, there would be.no privilege in litigation inter sese. The corporate
privilege probably would terminate upon dissolution of the legal entity;119
the individual's privilege would pass to his legal representative.120
As is so often the case, the task has been not so much to discover the rule
as to make a conscious choice. Nearly all the questions discussed here stem
from the fact that traditionally the attorney-client relationship has been a
highly personal one. Just as difficulties have been experienced in applying
the ethics of that personal relationship to expanded notions of legal services
(referral services, legal insurance programs, and the like), so difficulties will
be experienced in protecting the confidences granted lawyers who serve the
highly impersonal and complex corporate organizations of our time. Ultim-
ately it is the fundamental assumption to which I first referred which has
the last word on this subject. The more deeply one is convinced of the social
necessity of permitting corporations to consult frankly and privately with their
legal advisers, the more willing one should be to accord them a flexible and
generous protection. No doubt this is obvious, but as the story of the Em-
peror's new clothes illustrates, sometimes even a statement of the obvious is
useful.
119. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 209(c) (ii) (1942).
120. See 8 WiGmOm § 2329.
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